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INTRODUCTION
As the financial crisis fades in the rear view mirror,1 the asset 
management business continues to adjust to significant shifts in investor 
tastes.2  Observable trends include an increasing sensitivity to fees, a 
growing appetite for alternative streams of return, and a pronounced desire 
for regulated investment vehicles.3  Recently, asset managers have also 
witnessed a meaningful shift in investment philosophy – from active 
management to more passive strategies.4 At the same time, the asset 
management industry is showing the signs typical of a maturing business, 
as it strains to maintain its operating leverage.5 As one commentator has 
 1.  For a favorite summary of the financial crisis and its underlying causes, see
generally Michael C. Macchiarola, Beware of Risk Everywhere: An Important Lesson from 
the Current Credit Crisis, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 267 (2009) (outlining both the causes of the 
financial crisis as well as lessons to be learned from the crisis). 
 2.  See, e.g., Citi, The Rise of Liquid Alternatives & the Changing Dynamics of 
Alternative Product Manufacturing and Distribution, CITI PRIME FINANCE 4 (May 2013), 
http://cooconnect.com/sites/default/files/The%20rise%20of%20liquid%20alternatives%20a
nd%20the%20changing%20dynamics%20of%20product%20manufacturing%20and%20dist
ribution%20-%20May%202013.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/G3QV-5TA6] (noting that “shifting 
dynamics in the wealth adviser market are creating a growing need for alternative 
strategies.”).
 3.  Michael C. Macchiarola, Abstinence in the Face of the Mutual Fund Debt Elixir: In 
Response to Professor John Morley, 31 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 60 (2014) [hereinafter 
Macchiarola, Abstinence in the Face of Mutual Fund Debt]. See also Jeff Benjamin, The
Perfect Storm: Why Alts Make Sense, INVESTMENT NEWS (Mar. 30, 2014), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140330/REG/303309999/the-perfect-storm-why-
alts-make-sense [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/TB23-GL7V] (asserting that “diversifying into products 
and strategies designed to hedge risk can mean that clients can sleep soundly at night.”); 
SEI, The Retail Alternatives Phenomenon: What enterprising private fund managers need to 
know, SEIC 2 (2013) http://www.seic.com/docs/IMS/SEI-IMS-RetailAlternatives-US-
2013.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/53KJ-RV7D] [hereinafter SEI, The Retail Alternatives 
Phenomenon] (noting that “the blend of alternative strategies with the transparency, 
liquidity and regulatory oversight of regulated retail investment vehicles has growing appeal 
to financial advisors and their clients.”).
 4.  Eric Balchunas, Passive Revolution, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 14, 2015) 
(noting that U.S. investors allocated $365 billion to index mutual funds and ETFs and 
withdrew $147 billion from actively managed funds in 2015). 
 5.  Casey Quirk, The Roar of the Crowd: How Individual Investors Transform 
Competition in Asset Management, CASEY QUIRK BY DELOITTE 2 (Nov. 2015), 
http://www.caseyquirk.com/content/whitepapers/The%20Roar%20of%20the%20Crowd.pdf
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/7XDA-K3CL] [hereinafter Casey Quirk, The Roar]. See also Marlon 
Weems, Disintermediation: The Real Race to Zero, TABB FORUM (Sep. 25, 2013), 
http://tabbforum.com/opinions/disintermediation-the-real-race-to-zero 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/7A74-4K2X] (arguing that institutional accounts are struggling “to cut 
costs and recover from the turmoil of the past five years” and that “many have awakened to 
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observed, “[i]ncreasingly the same competitive dynamics that shape other 
financial services industries will affect asset managers: intensifying rivalry 
among too many players with similar value propositions, resulting in 
consolidation and disruption.”6 This realignment has brought volatility to 
the time-honored business model of the traditional asset manager.  At the 
same time, it is likely to uncover opportunities for new market entrants and 
innovative product structures.  This Article imagines one such structure. 
Recently, a lesser known corner of the investment products universe 
has been garnering significant attention from investors and asset managers 
alike.  While unit investment trusts (each, a “UIT”, and together, “UITs”) 
have evolved already “far beyond their humble origins as fixed packages of 
municipal bonds [and] have grown significantly in recent years,”7 the 
market remains far from exhausting its full potential.8  Advances in product 
structuring, an aversion to high fee product, and shifting investor tastes are 
latticing to expand the UIT’s possible applications.  The UIT is poised to 
emerge as a reliable, economic, and efficient conduit for investors seeking 
defined outcome,9 smart beta,10 and alternative streams of return.11
the logic of ‘insourcing.’”). 
 6.  Casey Quirk, The Roar, supra note 5, at 2. 
 7.  Daisy Maxey, Advisers Warm Up to Unit Investment Trusts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 
2012, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324469304578145432957312820  
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/YX6S-SF2Y]. See also Jay B. Gould and Gerald T. Lins, Unit 
Investment Trusts: Structure and Regulation Under the Federal Securities Laws, 43 BUS.
LAW. 1177 (Aug. 1988) (observing that “the number and variety of investment products 
offered to the general public has dramatically increased.”); Thomas S. Harman, Emerging
Alternatives to Mutual Funds: Unit Investment Trusts and Other Fixed Portfolio Investment 
Vehicles, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1045 (1987) (commenting that the UIT “has experienced many 
changes since its inception some sixty years ago as a ‘fixed trust.’”). 
 8.  In 2015, new UIT deposits were more than four times greater than those just a 
dozen years ago.  In fact, 2015 represented the largest year for new deposits into the 
product, eclipsing the prior record established in 1999. See INV. CO. INST., Section 2: 
Closed-End Funds, Exchange-Traded Funds, and Unit Investment Trusts, in 2016
INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK (2016), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2016_factbook.pdf 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/X7CR-J3DU] [hereinafter, 2016 ICI Fact Book] (showing $12.7 million 
and $65.9 million as the new UIT deposits for 2003 and 2015, respectively). 
 9.  For purposes of this Article, “defined outcome” investments will include products 
which allow for a specific level of protection and/or enhanced return to be put in place at the 
time of investment and last for a fixed time.  Such a process is typically achieved through 
the use of derivatives and allows investors to know the controlled range of the investment 
outcomes in advance and plan accordingly. 
 10.  The term “smart beta” is the subject of much attention and many compete to 
formalize its definition. See, e.g., Rob Arnott and Engin Kose, What “Smart Beta” Means to 
Us, RES. AFFILIATES FUNDAMENTALS 1 (Aug. 2014), 
https://www.researchaffiliates.com/documents/What%20Smart%20Beta%20Means%20To
%20Us%20v2_pdf.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/9MT8-RKDM] (noting that smart beta is “in the 
process of seeking an established meaning”). Our favorite definition is offered by Towers 
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Offerings of bespoke trusts might not be far in the future, unlocking the 
possibility of solutions tailored for retail and institutional investors seeking 
access to certain non-traditional streams of return, or anxious to improve 
the transparency, credit risk, liquidity, and economic bulwark of existing 
alternative investment and smart beta allocations. 
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I briefly describes the 
evolving landscape for public funds in the United States.  As much has 
been written on this subject, this section does not endeavor to break new 
ground.12  Instead, it describes simply the process by which today’s 
investors are transitioning from traditional mutual funds13 in favor of 
alternative mutual funds14 and smart beta strategies.15  This section of the 
Watson: “Smart beta is simply about trying to identify good investment ideas with better 
structure . . . smart beta strategies should be simple, low cost, transparent and systematic.” 
See Towers Watson, Understanding Smart Beta, 1, Aug. 2013 (explaining the purpose of 
smart beta).  
 11.  The relative size of the markets for open end funds, closed end funds, exchange 
traded funds and unit investment trusts is instructive.  Total assets for each category are by 
no means stagnant and have fluctuated over time. See generally ICI Fact Book, supra note 8 
(documenting fluctuations in investments in open end funds, closed end funds, exchange 
traded funds, and unit investment trusts). 
 12.  See generally Casey Quirk, The Complete Firm 2013: Competing for the 21st
Century Investor, CASEY QUIRK BY DELOITTE (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.caseyquirk.com/content/whitepapers/The%20Complete%20Firm.pdf 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/973K-HHGK] [hereinafter, Casey Quirk, The Complete Firm](detailing
the current trends and opportunities in public funds); Citi, The Rise of Liquid Alternatives & 
the Changing Dynamics of Alternative Product Manufacturing and Distribution, CITI PRIME
FINANCE (May 2013), http://cooconnect.com/sites/default/files/The%20rise%20of%20liquid 
%20alternatives%20and%20the%20changing%20dynamics%20of%20product%20manufact
uring%20and%20distribution%20-%20May%202013.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/E59P-CADU] 
(using survey findings to describe the various ways in which the industry is evolving); 
Goldman Sachs, Retail Liquid Alternatives: The Next Frontier, (Dec. 6, 2013) [hereinafter, 
Goldman Sachs, Retail] (highlighting the growth of retail liquid alternatives and how asset 
managers are beginning to take advantage of those opportunities); SEI, Regulated
Alternative Funds: The New Conventional, SEIC (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.seic.com/IMS/SEI_IMS_NewConventional.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/HL6X-
BU8P] [hereinafter SEI, Regulated Alternative Funds] (noting how various segments of 
investors are looking towards alternative strategies in response to a convergence of various 
factors and trends). 
 13.  For purposes of this Article, traditional mutual funds include those registered under 
the Investment Company Act and invested predominantly in the traditional fixed income 
and equity asset classes.  For purposes of this Article, such registration also distinguishes 
“public” funds from “private” funds. 
 14.  For purposes of this Article, alternative mutual funds include Investment Company 
Act-registered funds packaging returns of illiquid assets such as real estate, venture capital, 
commodities, and collectibles, as well as other more liquid “hedge fund” strategies such as 
event-driven, global macro, and managed future. See generally Equinox Funds, Allocating
to “Liquid Alternatives”: The Importance of Correlation, 3 (Apr. 11, 2016) (exploring 
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Article also establishes the background and proper context for the product-
specific ideas that follow.  Part II introduces the unit investment trust, 
outlining the general structure and limitations of the vehicle and exploring 
its legal and economic framework.  This Part also builds on the efforts of 
several authors to examine briefly the dynamic history of the UIT and 
summarizes the size and shape of today’s UIT market.16  Part III offers a 
general discussion of two related markets: structured notes and the nascent, 
fast-growing category of “liquid alternative mutual funds.”17  Particular 
emphasis is placed on defined outcome and smart beta strategies, as those 
lend themselves neatly to a unit investment trust product.  Part IV presents 
the Article’s main premise – many of the return streams offered in today’s 
structured notes or alternative mutual funds might be offered more reliably 
as unit investment trusts.  This Part outlines a viable framework for so-
called “structured unit investment trusts” or “structured funds”18 – designed 
to deliver defined outcome, smart beta, and alternative streams of return in 
a reliable, economic, and efficient fashion.  This Part highlights several 
advantages of such a product before describing briefly the ongoing efforts 
of market participants and handicapping the likelihood that such a product 
will be embraced by regulators and investors alike.  Finally, Part V offers a 
very brief conclusion. 
PART I
In recent years, the memory of the punishing losses wrought by the 
alternative investment strategies). 
 15.  Regarding a proper definition of “smart beta”, see Towers Watson, supra note 10. 
 16.  For an excellent, though slightly dated, history of the UIT vehicle, see Harman, 
supra note 7, at 1046. See also Gould and Lins, supra note 7, at 1177 (describing key 
features of UITs as well as the process of creating registering UITs). 
 17.  See, e.g., Janet Levaux, Alt Mutual Funds Hit $300B, RESEARCH (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2014/07/28/alt-mutual-funds-hit-300b?slreturn=1480213404 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/PU6M-YV3L] (noting that “2013 marked the strongest asset flows into 
alternative funds and the largest number of fund launches on record.”). 
 18.  This Article will use the terms “structured unit investment trust” and “structured 
fund” interchangeably.  While the product structure described herein conforms to the 
requirements of a unit investment trust articulated in Section 4(2) of the Investment 
Company Act, it also fits the common understanding of a “fund”, a term which remains 
undefined in the Investment Company Act. Historically, several UITs have described 
themselves as “funds,” the plain meaning of which presumably includes trusts. See
generally What is an “Investment Fund”, Investopedia.com, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/investment-fund.asp [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/3W32-
WW3X] (defining an “investment fund” as “a supply of capital belonging to numerous 
investors used to collectively purchase securities while each investor retains ownership and 
control of his own shares.”). 
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financial crisis, increased correlation among asset classes, unanticipated 
illiquidity, and celebrated scandals have combined to leave the traditional 
investment management industry bewildered.19  Most recently, investor 
demand for mutual funds declined in 2015, with net redemptions of $102 
billion.20  Mutual fund industry assets rarely decrease, with 2015 marking 
only the sixth time since 1975 that the total mutual fund assets measured at 
year-end failed to exceed those at the start of the year.21  During that same 
period, a developing industry that counted only 426 funds with $45 billion 
in assets, has ballooned to a mature business with greater than 8,000 funds 
and $15.6 trillion under management.22
Despite the exponential growth and massive size of the mutual fund 
market, fundamental questions have mounted in recent years.  Chief among 
the concerns is the issue of whether the menu of products – as currently 
constructed and sold – adequately meets the needs of a more discerning 
investing public increasingly conscious of fee levels, skeptical of the value 
of active management, and in search of a more tailored and tactical set of 
solutions.  As a recent industry report offered: 
Some of the outflows from long-term mutual funds in 2015 reflect 
a broader shift, driven by both investors and retirement plan 
sponsors, toward other pooled investment vehicles.  This trend is 
reflected in the outflows from actively managed funds and the 
growth of index mutual funds, ETFs, and collective investment 
trusts (CITs) since 2007.23
Investors and their financial advisors continue to assert broadening 
control over their investment portfolios – favoring product solutions which 
offer both absolute return and non-correlation.24  At the same time, 
 19.  See Macchiarola, Abstinence in the Face of Mutual Fund Debt, supra note 3 
(noting the Great Recessions disruptive impact on the investment management industry). 
See generally Christopher J. Bricker, Christine M. Johnson & Sandra Testani, Liquid
Alternatives: The Next Dimension in Asset Allocation, ALLIANCEBERNSTEIN 1 (July 2014), 
http://supplements.pionline.com/uploads/supplements/AB_Final_ALT-7125-0714.pdf 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/G2UM-W44J] (“The 2008 global financial crisis marked a turning point 
for investors, bringing new focus to the search for diversifying and transparent investment 
options.”).
 20.  2016 ICI Fact Book, supra note 8, at 26. 
 21.  Id.
 22.  2016 ICI Fact Book, supra note 8, at 170. 
 23.  Id. at 44. 
 24.  See, e.g., Jennifer Banzaca, Alternative Mutual Funds: How Can Hedge Fund 
Managers Organize and Operate Alternative Mutual Funds to Access Retail Capital? (Part 
One of Two), 6.5 HEDGE FUND LAW REP., Feb. 1, 2013 (noting that the “demand for retail 
alternative products is growing because of retail investors’ desires for innovative investment 
strategies, diversification and uncorrelated returns.”). See also Goldman Sachs, Retail,
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investors expect neatly tailored offerings that emphasize transparency and 
optimize liquidity.25  Demand is accelerating for investment products that 
“combine access to non-correlated strategies and asset classes with the 
liquidity and transparency of registered investment products.”26
Investors “increasingly regard ‘alternative’ investments – including 
unlisted securities, hedging strategies, derivatives and innovative 
structuring – as mainstream.”27  Those asset managers catering successfully 
to the growing demand for such products are likely to gain an increasing 
share of incremental industry dollars.28  So-called “alternative” strategies 
were once an exclusive corner of the investment world accessible only to 
institutional investors.29  Today, however, there is a demonstrable 
movement to “democratize” these strategies,30 with financial advisors 
increasingly turning to alternative investments to assist clients in achieving 
low correlation to traditional stocks and bonds, reduced portfolio volatility, 
and appropriate returns.31  The mass affluent and high-net-worth investors 
have accounted for the majority of the growth in alternative investment 
assets.32
As a matter of portfolio theory, the introduction of a non-traditional 
supra note 12 (describing a more discerning investing public). 
 25.  See, e.g., Banzaca, supra note 24 (highlighting that evolving investor preferences 
are one primary reason asset managers should look to alternative mutual funds.). 
 26.  SEI, Exotic to Mainstream: Growth of Alternative Mutual Funds in the U.S. and 
Europe 2 (2010). See also Goldman Sachs, Retail, supra note 12 (“Investors are re-risking, 
but with an eye for yield, uncorrelated asset classes and risk-adjusted returns.”); Josh 
Charney, Alternative Investments, All Grown Up, in 5 ALT. INVS. OBSERVER, no. 2, 2013, at 
4 http://advisor.morningstar.com/uploaded/pdf/AIO_QuarterlyQ22013_nonACC.PDF 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/2XXY-H2NZ] (“The recent drift into alternative investments can be 
traced to the challenges created by the post-2008 investment climate.”); Diane M. Sulzbach 
and Philip T. Masterson, Offering Alternative Investment Strategies in a Mutual Fund 
Structure: Practical Considerations, 15 THE INV. LAW., NO. 10, Oct. 2008, at 1 
(“[A]lternative investment products appeal to investors seeking to invest in hedge funds, 
who may not qualify to invest in them directly.”). 
 27.  Casey Quirk, The Complete Firm, supra note 12, at 7; see also Banzaca, supra note 
24, at 3 (noting that alternatives are quickly moving into the mainstream retail market). 
 28.  Casey Quirk, The Complete Firm, supra note 12, at 7. 
 29.  See SEI, Regulated Alternative Funds, supra note 12, at 1. 
 30.  See, e.g., id. (“In what is beginning to seem like the distant past, a clear line had 
once separated traditional and alternative investment products.”). 
 31.  Jeff Schlegel, Making Sense of Alternative Investments in the ‘40 Act Space,
FINANCIAL ADVISOR 1 (Jul. 22, 2013). See also Bricker, Johnson & Testani, supra note 19, 
at 2 (“Adding a liquid alternative allocation to a traditional portfolio has the potential to 
enhance long-term portfolio returns and reduce risk – and it may lower sensitivity to market 
and interest-rate fluctuations.”).
 32.  Casey Quirk, The Complete Firm, supra note 12, at 7. See also Citi Prime Finance, 
supra note 12, at 47 (suggesting that “[g]rowth in liquid alternatives is expected to come 
from a broadening set of retail investors.”).
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stream of return into the traditional 60/40 portfolio can have a profound 
effect on the efficient frontier – offering more expected return per unit of 
risk expended.  This concept lays at the heart of modern finance, which 
demarks an “efficient” portfolio as one seeking to reduce its overall risk 
without sacrificing return.33  In finance, efficiency is achieved by 
combining assets with returns that are less than perfectly correlated; that is 
achieved by adding to an existing portfolio an asset whose returns do not 
move in lock-step, thereby reducing the risk of the original portfolio.34  The 
application of Modern Portfolio Theory alone validates the impressive 
growth of the liquid alternatives category to date, as the traditional blend of 
fixed income and equities in a generic portfolio leaves an investor more 
exposed than is optimal as correlations converge during periods of market 
turbulence.35  The observable diversification benefit has been 
complemented by the fact that, in recent years, alternative assets have 
performed well on an absolute basis.36
In addition to the dual benefits of portfolio diversification and 
absolute return, the desire of investors to realize investment returns through 
more regulated conduits represents a natural response to the various high-
profile scandals that have beset the investment industry over the past 
several years.37  Some observers have suggested that many of the last spate 
of financial scandals might have been averted by the increased 
 33.  For a thoughtful reflection on the developments of Modern Portfolio Theory, see
generally Frank J. Fabozzi, Francis Gupta and Harry M. Markowitz, The Legacy of Modern 
Portfolio Theory, J. INVESTING 7 (Fall 2002) et seq. 
 34.  Id. at 8. 
 35.  See, e.g., Jon Danielsson, The Emperor has no Clothes: Limits to Risk Modelling, 
(June 2000), at 5 (describing how, for example, “the presence of VaR based risk limits led 
to the execution of similar trading strategies, escalating the crisis.”). See also Sarah Max, 
Alternative Investments: Surfing the Market, BARRON’S (Oct. 24, 2015) 
http://www.barrons.com/articles/alternative-investments-surfing-the-market-1445664165 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/5QRQ-SSHQ] (identifying Modern Portfolio Theory as the philosophy 
underpinning liquid alternative mutual funds). 
 36.  According to a study by the traditional asset manager AllianceBernstein, “Over the 
last 20 years, alternatives have provided better returns than stocks, bonds or cash, with less 
than half the volatility of stocks.” See Bricker, Johnson & Testani, supra note 19, at 2. 
 37.  The number and breadth of recent scandals is impressive indeed. While each 
scandal is proceeding through the legal and regulatory systems at its own pace (and no 
judgment is made on these pages with respect to any individual’s guilt or innocence), the 
spate of scandals have included alleged “rogue traders” (i.e. Jerome Kerviel at Société 
Générale, Bruno Iksil at JP Morgan and Kweku Adoboli at UBS), “rigged exchanges” (i.e. 
high frequency trading, LIBOR fixing, gold fixing), fraudulent funds (i.e. Madoff), greedy 
executives (i.e. Angelo Mozillo at Countrywide, Joseph Nacchio at Qwest), insider trading 
(i.e. Rajat Gupta, Raj Rajaratnam), corrupted counselors (i.e. Marc Dreier) and bad banks 
(i.e. Goldman Sachs “Abacus” deal, BNP Paribas illicit dollar trades). 
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transparency and regulation that today’s investors more regularly demand.38
For example, today’s more discerning and skeptical investing public 
requires routinely that investment exposures be bundled in highly regulated 
investment vehicles, with detailed specifications around risk measurement 
and management, liquidity, diversification, and leverage.39  Even when 
more sophisticated investors transact in less regulated product, deliberate 
attention is paid and care taken to ensure that assets and collateral are 
custodied and valued properly.40  One expression of the emphasis on 
regulated structures is the willingness of institutional accounts to invest in 
mutual fund holdings.41  This trend signals a rational response for any 
cohort for whom a quantifiable improvement in product design and 
regulation justifies the higher fee structure generally attributable to mutual 
fund shares, as the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment 
Company Act”) provides the comfort of a regulated vehicle which has 
enjoyed three quarters of a century virtually scandal free.42
 38.  See, e.g., Anita K. Krug, The Regulatory Response to Madoff, BERKELEY CTR. FOR 
LAW, BUS. & ECON. (Mar. 2009):
If the goal arising from the Madoff fraud is to better protect investors in hedge 
funds and other private funds, and if hedge funds’ operations evince information 
dispersion problems similar to those leading to the enactment of the Investment 
Company Act, then looking to the model of regulation established by the 
Investment Company Act may be an appropriate first step.  
But cf. Matt Taibbi, Why Didn’t the SEC Catch Madoff? It Might Have Been Policy Not To,
ROLLING STONE, May 31, 2013, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-didnt-the-
sec-catch-madoff-it-might-have-been-policy-not-to-20130531 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/US4P-
PG2W] (observing that, during the period from January 1, 2002 through January 20, 2009, 
the SEC failed to file a single case under the Investment Advisers Act or the Investment 
Company Act).
 39.  See, e.g., SEI, Regulated Alternative Funds, supra note 12, at 1 (describing 
generally various new alternative investment vehicles, both on the domestic frontier and 
abroad).
 40.  See generally Comm. Payments & Mkt. Infrastructures, Developments in 
Collateral Management Services, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS 1, Sep. 2014 
(describing an emphasis on the best practices of collateral management and observing that 
“market participants that provide large-scale lending have shown an increased preference 
for secured lending transactions over unsecured lending transactions.”). 
 41.  See, e.g., Corrie Driebusch, The New ABCs of Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Jun. 3, 
2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324063304578523154145807688 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/RF67-DSS9] (commenting that the institutional share class of mutual 
funds had grown its assets from $766 billion in 2003 to $3.4 trillion in 2013, marking the 
“biggest growth of any type of share class Morningstar tracks.”). 
 42.  See, e.g., Paul Roye, Division Director of Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S., Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Keynote Address at the EEESI General Membership Meeting 2000: Regulation of 
Mutual Funds in the United States: A Successful Regulatory Regime (Sept. 22, 2000) 
(noting that the Investment Company Act “has proved to be remarkably resilient”); see also
John Morley, The Regulation of Mutual Fund Debt, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 343, 344 (2013) 
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Spurred by the dual demands of an alternative asset return profile and 
a more regulated product wrapper, the past few years have seen the 
emergence of a new supply of funds broadly characterized as “liquid 
alternatives.”43  Generally, this term describes investments offering access 
to alternative investment strategies via more traditional structures such as 
mutual funds, closed-end funds, UCITS, or exchange traded funds.44
Private fund managers and their trading programs often provide the content 
of these liquid alternative funds, as historically such firms have dominated 
the management of the investor pools in alternative asset categories which 
include long/short equity, global macro, managed futures, private equity, 
real estate, merger arbitrage, and commodities.45  Recent changes to the 
capital markets precipitated by the financial crisis coupled with a low 
interest-rate environment and the enormous growth of private funds, has 
encouraged the demand for these alternatives by retail investors.46  In 
embracing liquid alternatives, private managers must adjust to the reality, 
however, that fees charged for products regulated under the Investment 
Company Act are lower than those for the typical hedge fund.47  Moreover, 
registered investment companies are prohibited from charging a 
performance fee common to most private funds and infrastructure and 
distribution costs add additional pressure to the economics for new advisors 
(observing the “almost complete absence of bankruptcies among mutual funds in the last 70 
years.”).
 43.  For a list of the liquid alternative mutual funds launched in 2014 alone, see List of 
New Liquid Alternative Funds Launched in 2014, DAILYALTS, 2016, 
http://dailyalts.com/new-liquid-alternative-fund-launches-2014/ [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/4HMK-
Y3BJ]. 
 44.  See generally William Marr and Alexander Rubin, The Emergence of Liquid 
Alternatives and the Case for Managed Futures Mutual Funds, 2, (2012) 
https://www.umbfs.com/groups/public/documents/web_content/039761.pdf 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/A2XR-VLED] (describing the growth of liquid alternatives and managed 
futures mutual funds as investment funds). 
 45.  Unless otherwise stated, the terms “private fund” and “hedge fund” will be used 
interchangeably throughout this Article. In each case, the term describes a fund exempt from 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 by the terms of Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7). 
 46.  See Wulf A. Kaal, Confluence of Private and Mutual Funds (U of St. Thomas 
(Minnesota) Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-06) at 4, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/HY59-
JWP5] (noting that the net assets into liquid alternative funds “increased almost 200% from 
2009 to 2014.”). 
 47.  See generally Barclays Prime Services, Going Mainstream: Developments and 
Opportunities for Hedge Fund Managers in the ‘40 Act Space, BARCLAYS at 13-14 (Apr. 
2014) http://www.barclayscommunications.com/CapSol_Publications/492282/ 
Going_Mainstream_A4.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/6JCL-HLD2] [hereinafter, Barclays, Going
Mainstream] (describing the reaction of hedge fund managers to the reality of a far different 
fee and expenses model in the ‘40 Act space). 
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and sub-advisors.48
Alternative streams of return are also accessible through various 
passive strategies, which have proliferated in recent years, as investors 
have grown concerned about the efficacy of active management.  Despite 
the commercial success of active managers, it has long been accepted in 
academic circles that these managers rarely outperform a benchmark over 
any meaningful interval of time.49  This relative underperformance and the 
higher transaction costs of actively managed funds have energized a search 
for more efficient means of accessing market returns.50
In recent years, that search has resulted in a burgeoning group of so-
called “smart beta” strategies.51  These strategies attempt to improve or 
alter the return profile of an investment relative to more-traditional market 
benchmarks.52  Smart beta architects seek to (i) distill investment returns 
into their individual component parts and (ii) build transparent, rules-based 
strategies reliably providing exposure to those market segments, factors, or 
 48.  See generally Barclays, Going Mainstream, supra note 47, at 13-14 (describing the 
reaction of hedge fund managers to the reality of a far different fee and expenses model in 
the ‘40 Act space). In addition, the popularity of expense caps and 12b-1 fees coupled with 
the investor preference for institutional share classes make the margins for registered 
products very thin when compared to hedge funds. See SEI, The Retail Alternatives 
Phenomenon, supra note 3, at 21 (observing that “many private funds have chosen to be 
sub-advisors, allowing them to focus on investment management while the sponsoring firm 
handles distribution, administration and back-office functions.”) 
 49.  See, e.g., Burton Malkiel, Reflections on the Efficient Market Hypothesis: 30 Years 
Later, 40 FIN. REVIEW 1, 1-3 (2005) (suggesting that “a blindfolded chimpanzee throwing 
darts at the stock pages could select a portfolio that would do as well as the experts,” and 
observing that large cap equity funds are outperformed by the S&P 500 Index® for a 1, 3, 5 
and 10-year period between 63 and 90% of the time). 
 50.  See, e.g., Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the Design of Financial Products, 
Olden Lane Whitepaper No. 2 (June 2016) at 3 [hereinafter Olden Lane No. 2] (“Economy, 
efficiency and exposure in the form of betas, both traditional and alternative, are the 
watchwords of the time.”). 
 51.  See Smart Beta: 2015 global survey findings from asset owners, FTSE RUSSELL 1
(2016), http://www.ftserussell.com/sites/default/files/research/smart_beta_2015_ 
global_survey_findings_from_asset_owners_final.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/LZ8A-P842]
(“Strategy-based exposures have gained a lot in popularity over the past few years.”). See
also Ben Johnson, A Sensible Approach to ‘Smart Beta’, MORNINGSTAR (May 14, 2014) 
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=647771 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/98A4-
SNKC] (observing 59% growth year-over-year and describing “smart beta” as at the 
“leading edge of the most recent wave of product proliferation within the global exchange–
traded products landscape.”); Paul Sullivan, ‘Smart Beta’ Investing Lets the Yardstick Pick 
the Stocks, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2014, at B5 (describing the exponential growth of smart 
beta investing). 
 52.  Johnson, supra note 51. Cf. Towers Watson, supra note 10 (describing the appeal 
of smart beta strategies as a realization that certain hedge fund strategies “can be reproduced 
with simple, easily accessible strategies at a lower cost.”). 
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concepts.53  While some commentators have proclaimed the smart beta 
movement to be in its infancy,54 others have declared it a fad, questioning 
whether it is anything more than “another example of marketing hype by 
product providers.”55  To date, smart beta strategies have been accessed 
primarily through over-the-counter derivatives or structured notes, and, in 
either case, typically with a bank as counterparty. 
In smart beta, the nation’s leading banks have developed a 
considerable inventory of systematic investment content to capitalize on 
growing investor demand for passive and systematic investment.  Yet, 
together all the bank proprietary strategies, which number in the hundreds 
if not thousands, account for only $100 billion in assets under 
management.56  The strategies developed by the global banks suffer from a 
low value structure of delivery, with distribution confined to those 
investors with the financial and personnel resources to conclude and 
manage ISDA agreements or a shrinking number of other investors willing 
to buy a bank issued structured note. In smart beta, content and structure 
today remain very much at odds. 
Non-traditional strategies continue to creep into the fund space.57
They represent a challenge to the traditional top-down asset management 
firm structure where managers are grown organically and allocations are 
decided subjectively by internal staff.  Instead, alternative funds tend 
toward a “sourcing and structuring” model in which investment decisions 
are derived more systematically.  In such a construct, the fund sponsor adds 
value by identifying desirable streams of return or trading programs and 
optimizing the delivery of those returns to investors.  As a result, traditional 
asset managers looking to run an alternative sleeve of their business in a 
 53.  See generally Smart Beta: Implications for Active Management, RUSSELL
INVESTMENTS 4 (Sep. 2013), http://www.cfasociety.org/orlando/Lists/EventsCalendar/ 
Attachments/1/Russell%20Smart%20Beta%20Indexes_IAM_Agather_Final.pdf
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/8SFM-KEE]. 
 54.  See, e.g., Towers Watson, supra note 10, at 2 (“We believe we are still at the 
‘pioneer’ stage in the evolution of smart beta”). 
 55.  Chris Flood, Market divided over smart-beta success, FIN. TIMES (May 4, 2014), 
https://www.ft.com/content/fc6feaa8-c497-11e3-b2fb-00144feabdc0 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/25Q7-28UX]. 
 56.  This number was offered privately to the authors in a presentation not for onward 
distribution. The authors have retained the presentation. 
 57.  See, e.g., Morningstar and Barron’s 2014-2015 Alternative Investment Survey of 
U.S. Institutions and Financial Advisors, MORNINGSTAR 5 (July 2015), http://leeds-
faculty.colorado.edu/grossd/MBAX%206220%20Fall%202016/Readings/Morningstar%20
Alternative%20Investment%20Survey%202014-2015.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/R4PJ-4Z69] 
[hereinafter Morningstar and Barron’s] (suggesting that “[e]ven as flows have moderated, 
fund companies continue to launch funds at a record clip”). 
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manner similar to their existing business are likely to find confusion and 
disappointment.58  The transition to liquid alternative funds will more likely 
reward those nimble and enterprising firms best able to (1) source reliably 
coveted alternative streams of return or smart beta indices, (2) deliver 
adroitly and consistently those streams in the most desirable and economic 
wrapper for investors, and (3) educate the marketplace and distribute 
effectively and consistently the resulting product into the appropriate sales 
channel.  As the remainder of this Article hopes to highlight, the UIT offers 
tremendous flexibility and promise in this regard. 
PART II
A unit investment trust is an investment vehicle which qualifies as an 
“investment company” pursuant to the requirements of the Investment 
Company Act.59  Typically organized under a trust indenture, UITs issue 
“only redeemable securities, each of which represents an undivided interest 
in a unit of specified securities.”60  The trust indenture sets forth the 
important provisions of the UIT, including its term, the conditions by 
which it may be terminated early, and the responsibilities of its sponsor, 
evaluator, and trustee.61  The Investment Company Act distinguishes UITs 
from management investment companies by requiring that UITs have a 
 58.  In large measure, we think far too many of today’s asset managers are content to sit 
on an annuity earned for their organization by those who blazed a trail many years ago. 
Moreover, if alternatives are more fully embraced by investors, many asset managers are 
going to be targeted for disintermediation. See SEI, The Retail Alternatives Phenomenon,
supra note 3, at 3 (cautioning private fund managers that “[t]he distribution of retail 
alternatives is complex, involving a maze of sales channels, specialized consultants and 
intermediary platforms.”).  
 59.  See Investment Company Act § 4(2)(a)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4 (defining a unit 
investment trust as “an investment company which (A) is organized under a trust indenture, 
contract of custodianship or agency, or similar instrument, (B) does not have a board of 
directors, and (C) issues only redeemable securities, each of which represents an undivided 
interest in a unit of specified securities; but does not include a voting trust.”). See also
Gould and Lins, supra note 7, at 1178 (“Because a unit investment trust both issues 
securities and uses the proceeds to purchase securities, it comes within the definition of an 
investment company”).
 60.  See Investment Company Act § 4(2)(a)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4  (describing the 
characteristics of a unit investment trust). See also Unit Investment Trusts, U.S. SEC,
www.sec.gov/answers/uit.htm [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/KSA5-73Y9] (setting out the traditional 
traits of a UIT). 
 61.  See Gould and Lins, supra note 7, at 1180 (noting the essential parts of a trust 
indenture). See also US Securities and Exchange Commission, Div. of Inv. Mgmt., 
Memorandum on the Reg. and Operation of Unit Inv. Trs., (Sept. 1988), 5 [hereinafter 
Regulation and Operation Memo] (recognizing that a unit investment trust is managed by a 
trust indenture, rather than a board of directors). 
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fixed portfolio, essentially no management, and maintain a simple capital 
structure.62  Because UITs lack a board of directors, corporate officers, or 
an investment advisor, active management is prohibited within the 
vehicle.63  As a result, UITs are more constrained than other available fund 
structures (i.e. actively managed open-end funds) and are comprised of 
portfolios sometimes described as static or “fixed.”64  Concurrent with the 
creation of the unit investment trust structure, the Chief Counsel of the 
Investment Trust Study described the vehicle to Congress as “[a] device, 
whereby they sell an individual an interest in a package of securities, a list 
of which is made known,” adding that “they cannot change the package, 
except under certain circumstances.”65
The absence of management in UITs has traditionally referred to a 
prohibition against the substitution of investments that are not specified in 
the UIT’s prospectus and governing documents on its inception date.66
This feature provides an important protection against any self-dealing or 
conflict of interest of an investment manager.  In the unit investment trust, 
management is ordinarily reduced to a minimum, as “the controlling 
document, the trust agreement, usually specifies not only the securities in 
which the funds may be invested but also the specific number of each 
 62.  See generally LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, TRANSMITTING PURSUANT TO LAW, A REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND 
INVESTMENT COMPANIES, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, H.R. DOC. NO.
567 at 15 (1940) [hereinafter LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SEC] (“The investor was 
assured, therefore, that both changes in his investment and manipulation were impossible.”). 
See also Regulation and Operation Memo, supra note 61, at 2 (“Unlike the more prevalent 
type of investment company such as the mutual fund, a UIT does not have an investment 
adviser that manages its portfolio.”). 
 63.  See generally Investment Company Act § 4(2)(a)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(2)(a)-(c) 
(defining a “unit investment trust”). See also Harman, supra note 7, at 1047 (“Because 
UITs, unlike mutual funds, have no investment adviser or board of directors, certain 
provisions of the 1940 Act clearly are irrelevant to them.”). 
 64.  But cf. Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman, Unit Investment Trusts, in FINANCIAL PRODUCT
FUNDAMENTALS, 8-29 (Clifford E. Kirsch, ed. 2016) (noting that “the fixed trust concept has 
evolved significantly over time.”). 
 65.  See A Bill to Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Investment Companies 
and Investment Advisors, and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Banking and Currency 76th Cong. 3 at 184 (1940) (testimony of David 
Schenker, Chief Counsel of the Investment Trust Study of the SEC) (describing a “fixed 
trust” in connection with the development of the UIT concept). 
 66.  See, e.g., PaineWebber Equity Trs., SEC Division of Investment Management No-
Action Letter, No. 811-3722 (Jul. 19, 1993) https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/ 
noaction/1993/painewebber071993.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/6BE7-TAUH] (granting no-
action relief where equity holdings of a UIT will be sold in the event that their ratings fall 
below a predetermined level and the “proceeds from disposition will not be reinvested in 
substitute securities.”). 
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 93 S
ide A
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 93 Side A      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
5_MACCHIAROLA_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/17 11:06 AM
2017] EXPANDING ALTERNATIVES 419 
security which may be purchased.”67
Concerned about abuses that had taken place in “fixed trust” 
predecessors of the UIT vehicle, Congress included a special section of the 
Investment Company Act setting minimum requirements for a UIT’s trust 
indenture and addressing certain abuses.68  For example, Section 26 of the 
Investment Company Act imposes a minimum capital requirement for 
banks chosen as UIT trustees,69 enforces limitations on the fees chargeable 
to unitholders, and sets certain requirements with respect to UIT assets.70
These requirements prohibit a trustee from resigning before a successor is 
appointed or trust assets are liquidated,71 and requires the UIT sponsor to 
maintain unitholder records and to inform unitholders in the event that a 
security is replaced within the UIT’s portfolio.72
In a thorough analysis of the structure, the SEC’s former chief counsel 
concluded that UITs offer “attractive investments because they offer 
liquidity and diversity at an affordable price.”73  The affordability in 
 67.  LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SEC, supra note 62 (noting that the trust 
agreement plays a managerial role in unit investment trusts). See also Regulation and 
Operation Memo, supra note 61, at 21 (“substitution of portfolio securities should only 
occur under unusual circumstances, for example, when the creditworthiness or economic 
viability of the issuer of the portfolio security is seriously in doubt.”); see also A Bill to 
Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Investment Companies and Investment 
Advisors, and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Banking and Currency 76th Cong. 3 at 300 (1940)(testimony of John H. Hollands, SEC 
staff attorney) (adding that “[t]he investor really exercises his own judgment, because he is 
ordinarily shown the list of securities in which his funds will be invested, and it is only 
under very special circumstances that the portfolio can be changed and those securities 
eliminated and others substituted.”). 
 68.  Gould and Lins, supra note 7, at 1180.
 69.  See Investment Company Act § 26(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(a)(1) Section (setting 
the minimum capital requirement at $500,000). 
 70.  See Investment Company Act § 26(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(a)(2) (noting the 
conditions where a unit investment trust can be sold). See also Regulation and Operation 
Memo, supra note 61, at 19 et seq. (describing the workings of Section 26(a)(2)). 
 71.  See Investment Company Act § 26(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(a)(3) of Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (“[T]he trustee or custodian shall not resign until either (A) the trust 
has been completely liquidated and the proceeds of the liquidation distributed to the security 
holders of the trust, or (B) a successor trustee or custodian, having the qualifications 
prescribed in paragraph (1), has been designated”). 
 72.  See Investment Company Act § 26(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(a)(4) (“[A] record 
will be kept by the depositor or an agent of the depositor of the name and address of, and the 
shares issued by the trust and held by, every holder of any security issued pursuant to such 
instrument”). See also Regulation and Operation Memo, supra note 61, at 21 (“The trust 
indenture must provide that whenever a portfolio security is substituted the depositor must 
mail a notice of the substitution to unitholders within five days after the substitution.”). 
 73.  Harman, supra note 7, at 1046. See also Kleiman, supra note 64, at 8-2 (noting that 
UITs “provide a unique opportunity for the investor who seeks the diversification and 
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comparison to the typical mutual fund has two main drivers.  First, the UIT 
lacks an investment adviser “to whom it must pay an annual management 
fee.”74  Instead, a trust’s assets will theoretically remain in the trust for its 
entire term, allowing the investor “to make the investment decisions rather 
than an investment advisor or manager” and, at the same time, allay any 
“fears of portfolio manipulation or mismanagement.”75  Aside from 
protecting against style drift that often besets managed funds, the fixed 
nature of the UIT portfolio also ensures that brokerage commissions will be 
smaller than those of the typical mutual fund, which pays to turn over its 
portfolio on a more frequent basis.76  An illustration comparing the main 
attributes of the mutual fund and the UIT structures is provided in Figure 1 
below. 
liquidity of a mutual fund without the costs associated with portfolio management.”); see
also Gould and Lins, supra note 7, at 1177 (observing that “a UIT permits the average 
investor to diversify at an affordable cost” and listing “diversification, professional 
investment management and economies of scale in transaction costs” as attributes of the 
UIT); Regulation and Operation Memo, supra note 61, at 2 (“Because a UIT is unmanaged, 
it also permits an investor – unlike a mutual fund – to obtain diversification without paying 
an annual management fee.”). 
 74.  Harman, supra note 7, at 1046. 
 75.  Gould and Lins, supra note 7, at 1181. 
 76.  Harman, supra note 7, at 1046. See generally Brian Reid and Kimberlee Millar, 
Mutual Funds and Portfolio Turnover, INV. CO. INST. RES. COMMENT. (Nov. 17, 2004), 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/rc_v1n2.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/3XNZ-DYH2] (describing the 
importance of understanding the trading activities of fund managers and the transaction 
costs they incur). 
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MUTUAL FUND UIT 
PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT
Active Static portfolio 
STRUCTURE Corporation or Business 
Trust 
Trust 
GOVERNANCE Actively overseen by 
board of directors or 
trustees
Minimally 
supervised by a 
trustee
No board of 
directors
REDEEMABILITY Redeemable daily at NAV Secondary market 
liquidity
Redeemable daily at 
NAV
TERM Indefinite Fixed life 1 to 99 
years
TAX Sub-chapter M Sub-chapter M 
Grantor Trust 
DISTRIBUTION Continuously on a “best 
effort” basis through 
distributor
Single firm 
commitment of a 
fixed size through a 
syndicate
FEES & CHARGES Management fee, custody 
fees, transfer agency fees, 
shareholder servicing cost, 
sales charges and ongoing 
distribution fees 
Sales charge and 
minimal ongoing 
trustee and sponsor 
fees
FIGURE 1.77
As an investment company, the UIT is required to adhere to the strict 
registration and disclosure regime of the federal securities laws.  A UIT 
sponsor must navigate both the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities 
Act”) and the Investment Company Act, as UITs register their units under 
the Securities Act after registering the trust entity itself under the 
 77.  Adapted from a chart appearing at Kleiman, supra note 64, at App. 8A-1. 
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Investment Company Act.78  A UIT is typically comprised of multiple 
series, with each series referring to a distinct portfolio of assets.  An 
individual unitholder, therefore, looks only to the performance of a 
particular series’ portfolio of underlying assets for her investment return.79
And because each series is considered a distinct offering under the 
Securities Act, filing a separate registration statement to gain effectiveness 
under Section 8(a) and with its assets and liabilities ring-fenced from those 
of any other series of the same trust.80  By contrast, the trust itself – and not 
each series – registers under the Investment Company Act. 
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT AND SECURITIES ACT REGISTRATION
Because a UIT “both issues securities and uses the proceeds to 
purchase securities,” it fits within the statutory definition of an investment 
company described in Section 3(a)(1) of the Investment Company Act.81
The regulation of a UIT under the Investment Company Act is highly 
tailored, however, to account for the vehicle’s unique characteristics versus 
other investment company types.  Form N-8B-2 describes the trust and the 
units that it will offer to the public.  The form requires disclosures 
regarding the sponsor, various workings of the trust, its fees, expenses and 
sales loads and provisions for the purchase, sale, creation and redemption 
of securities.82
In 1982, the SEC adopted Rule 487 of the Securities Act, granting 
UITs registration relief not previously granted to any other type of issuer.83
 78.  See generally Harman, supra note 7, at 1061:
Each series is considered a separate offering under the 1933 Act and must file a separate 
registration statement that becomes effective under section 8(a) of that act. Only the trust 
itself, however – and not each series – need register under the 1940 Act. 
See also Regulation and Operation Memo, supra note 61, at 12-13 (noting the registration 
requirements for unit investment trusts). 
 79.  Harman, supra note 7, at 1061. See also Regulation and Operation Memo, supra
note 61, at 3 (“Each series is, essentially, a separate investment company, and an investor 
looks solely to the series in which he has invested for his investment return.”). 
 80.  Kleiman, supra note 64, at 8-16. 
 81.  Gould and Lins, supra note 7, at 1178. See also Investment Company Act § 
3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-3(a)(1) (defining investment company as a securities issuer that 
invests and reinvests securities). 
 82.  Gould and Lins, supra note 7, at 1194-95. See also Regulation and Operation 
Memo, supra note 61, at 13 (describing the Form N-8B-2 disclosures). 
 83.  See Automatic Effectiveness of Registration Statements Filed By Certain Unit 
Investment Trusts, Securities Act Release No. 6401 (May 7, 1982)  
[hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 6401] (describing the registration requirements for 
UITs); see also Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, 
Exchange Act Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. 
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After a trust’s registration pursuant to Form N-8B-2 and following the 
effectiveness of a trust’s first series, Rule 487 permits subsequent 
registration statements filed by the same trust to “become effective 
automatically on a date and at a time designated by the registrant, if certain 
conditions are met.”84  Rule 487 represented a concession by the SEC that 
there are often substantial similarities in the series issued by UITs and an 
acknowledgement that the de novo review of registration statements could 
become both “routine” and “burdensome” for Commission staff.85
Following the Rule’s adoption, the SEC grants UITs automatic 
effectiveness if the sponsor can represent that the disclosures made in 
respect of a new trust 
[D]o not differ in any material respect from those contained in the 
registration statements of one or more specifically identified 
previous series of the trust, except to the extent such differences 
are necessary to identify the specific portfolio securities of, and to 
provide essential information for, the series being registered.86
Aside from streamlining the review process for the regulator, Rule 487 
brings a significant advantage for UIT issuers, as it enables UIT issuers to 
bring product to market whenever they choose, unconstrained by 
Commission review.87  As a commercial matter, the Rule shortens the UIT 
selling cycle – from conception to actual sale – distinguishing it from any 
other product regulated under the Investment Company Act and more 
closely aligning it with the typical selling cycle for structured notes.88
Reg. 44,722, 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.) (adopting 
subsequent rule related to a similar concept embedded in the shelf registration rules ushered 
in by Securities Offering Reform). 
 84.  Securities Act Release No. 6401, supra note 83, at 1. 
 85.  See, e.g., Statement of John S.R. Shad to the Subcommittee on Securities of the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Mar. 25, 1983) at 86 
(commenting that UITs that differ “only with respect to the specific composition of the 
portfolio . . . do not present disclosure issues that require staff review and comment prior to 
effectiveness of the registration statement.”). See also Regulation and Operation Memo, 
supra note 61, at 15-16 (offering that “subsequent series of a UIT rarely present new 
substantive issues.”). 
 86.  Securities Act Release No. 6401, supra note 83, at 2. 
 87.  See Harman, supra note 7, at 1063 (expounding on the impact of rule 487). 
 88.  See Harman, supra note 7, at 1063 (observing that adoption of the Rule made UIT 
sponsors “the first issuers to gain the sort of control over the registration process that some 
corporate issuers would later gain when rule 415 – the ‘shelf-registration’ rule – was 
adopted.”).
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A. Creation and Liquidity of a Unit Investment Trust 
While the structure of a particular series of a unit investment trust will 
differ depending on the nature of its underlying portfolio, the essential 
mechanics of each offering will remain quite similar.  In all cases, the 
process of creation is initiated by the sponsor’s acquisition of a portfolio of 
securities satisfying the series’ investment objectives.  The sponsor 
deposits the securities with the trustee in exchange for the receipt of units 
representing fractional undivided interests (“units”) of the trust.  Once 
created (and, in all cases, following the effectiveness of a registration 
statement), units are offered to the public through the sponsor and other 
broker dealers at a public offering price.89  During the initial offering 
period, the public offering price will be based upon the aggregate market 
value of the portfolio’s underlying securities plus a front-end sales charge.90
Today, the sales charge for the typical UIT offering ranges from 1.95% to 
5.5% of the public offering price, depending upon the offering’s term and 
the type of securities comprising the underlying portfolio.91
A UIT’s portfolio is selected by its sponsor to reflect a specific 
investment theme.  UIT products have been traditionally categorized into 
three main styles: (i) tax-exempt debt, (ii) taxable debt, and (iii) equity 
UITs.92  Tax-exempt UITs invest in portfolios of municipal bonds and pass 
through tax-exempt interest income to unitholders.  New assets deposited 
into tax-exempt UITs totaled just $875 million in 2015, down from $915 
million in 2014.93  Taxable debt UITs include portfolios comprised of some 
combination of U.S. and/or international corporate bonds, government 
 89.  See, e.g., Prospectus, Capital Strength Portfolio, Series 24, FT 4727, (Apr. 11, 
2014), http://www.ftportfolios.com/Common/ContentFileLoader.aspx?ContentGUID= 
1c5c93aa-48ed-4125-a862-38a0132a2741 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/S3N7-U7QF] (making units 
available at a $10.00 public offering price).  
 90.  Most offerings also include a deferred sales charge. However, specific exemptive 
relief must be granted by the SEC before a deferred sales charge can be collected. See, e.g.,
Prospectus, Capital Strength Portfolio, Series 35, Ft. 6241 (Sep. 16, 2016), 
https://www.ftportfolios.com/Common/ContentFileLoader.aspx?ContentGUID=8d88cbf2-
db18-4715-901c-75836595882a [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/G9TS-7HBP] (making units available at 
a $10.00 public offering price). 
 91.  Presumably, the market could support a premium for a UIT requiring complex 
structuring. The maximum charge is typically subject to reduction under certain 
circumstances, including volume discounts, which typically depend on the type and term of 
the series, which can vary. 
 92.  2016 ICI Fact Book, supra note 8, at 185. This categorization, however, can be 
misleading. The equity category, for example, serves as a catch-all and includes trusts with 
underlyings varying from closed end funds to business development companies. 
 93.  2016 ICI Fact Book, supra note 8, at 185. 
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bonds, or government agency certificates.94  New assets deposited into 
taxable debt UITs totaled $492 million in 2015, down from $624 million in 
2014.95  Equity-related UITs comprise the significant majority of the 
market’s assets today.  These trusts often construct portfolios around a 
particular investment theme or market sector.96  New assets deposited into 
equity-related UITs totaled $64.5 billion in 2015, slightly exceeding the 
$63.9 billion of issuance from a year earlier.97  Overall, 1,619 new trusts 
were created in 2015, with the average new trust taking deposits of just 
more than $40 million.98
Unit holders are provided liquidity through the secondary market and 
via redemption.99  While under no obligation to do so, sponsors regularly 
maintain a secondary market for units of each outstanding series.100  Other 
broker-dealers may also maintain a secondary market for units.  In such a 
secondary market, investor purchases are executed at the current public 
offering price plus a front-end sales charge.101  The sales charge imposed by 
a series on a secondary market transaction varies because of, among other 
things, the type of portfolio securities held and the term of the series. The 
maximum sales charge imposed in a secondary market may also be subject 
 94.  2016 ICI Fact Book, supra note 8, at 20. 
 95.  2016 ICI Fact Book, supra note 8, at 185. 
 96.  See, e.g., Prospectus, Capital Strength Portfolio, Series 25, FT 4874, (Jun. 25, 
2014) (comprised of companies with the following qualities: well-capitalized with strong 
balance sheets; skilled management; high liquidity; ability to generate earnings growth; and 
a record of financial strength and profit growth); Prospectus, Incapital Unit Trust, Series 44, 
Incapital Morningstar Wide Moat Portfolio, (Form 2Q) (Apr. 10, 2014) (describing a UIT 
comprised of portfolio of equity securities of companies recommended by Morningstar 
Investment Services, Inc. that the Sponsor believes has the best chance of capital 
appreciation over its life).   
 97.  2016 ICI Fact Book, supra note 8, at 185. 
 98.  Based on monthly data compiled by the Investment Company Institute and 
maintained by the authors. 
 99.  Presumably, both the UIT sponsor and its unitholders benefit from a secondary 
market. The sponsor typically receives a sales charge on units resold in the secondary 
market. Unitholders benefit from the fact that the trust does not have to sell its assets - 
possibly under disadvantageous circumstances - to meet redemptions, meaning that the fixed 
costs of the trust are absorbed by a larger pool of investors. 
 100.  See, e.g., Prospectus, Nuveen Unit Investment Trust, Series 166, Nuveen Argus 
Modern Innovators Portfolio, 4Q 2016, (Oct. 20, 2016) at B-8 
https://www.incapnet.com/Pages/Public/PublicWebsiteDocumentFetch.aspx?FileId=45499c
1b-6adb-41e8-a9ed-888a17881b0e [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/WN4T-ARQT] (providing that 
“Nuveen intends to, but is not obligated to, maintain a secondary market for units” and 
cautioning that “[i]f the Sponsor decides to maintain a secondary market, it may suspend or 
discontinue purchases of units of the Trust if the supply of units exceeds demand, or for 
other business reasons.”). 
 101.  See Id. (stating that secondary market transactions for units will be “at the current 
price which is based on the net asset value.”). 
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to volume discounts based on the amount of units purchased.102  In the 
event that a secondary market is not maintained, unitholders may take 
advantage of the UIT’s liquidity requirement by redeeming units through 
the trustee at prices generally based upon the evaluation of the underlying 
securities.103
B. Participants in a UIT Offering 
There are several important participants in a successful UIT offering.  
The function of the sponsor, trustee, supervisor and evaluator are described 
below. 
A UIT’s sponsor, often referred to as the depositor, organizes the trust 
and launches each series with the deposit of the initial portfolio of assets 
with the trustee.104  As a general matter, the sponsor bears all of the trust’s 
organizational costs.105  In 1995, however, the Commission allowed for 
certain organizational expenses to be charged to the trust itself.106  These 
charges included the costs of preparing and printing the registration 
statement and organizational trust documents, the registration of units and 
the trust’s initial audit.107  For its services, the depositor typically earns a 
one-time creation and development fee at a series’ inception.108  Also, for 
 102.  See, e.g., Prospectus, First Trust Dow® Target 5 4Q ‘16 - Term 1/9/18, First Trust 
6350, at 70 (Oct. 7, 2016) (describing generally the volume discounts and limiting the 
program to units not eligible for a separate rollover, redemption or termination proceeds 
discount). Cf. Prospectus, Business Development Company Opportunities Portfolio, Series 
2016-3 REIT Portfolio, Series 2016-3 - A Hartford Investment Management Company 
(“HIMCO”) Portfolio, Advisors Disciplined Trust 1718 (Jul. 29, 2016) at 38 (“Secondary 
market sales of all unit trusts are excluded for purposes of these volume concessions”). 
 103.  See Investment Company Act, § 22(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (“No registered 
investment company shall suspend the right of redemption, or postpone the date of payment 
or satisfaction upon redemption of any redeemable security in accordance with its terms for 
more than seven days after the tender of such security to the company or its agent 
designated for that purpose for redemption”). See also Regulation and Operation Memo, 
supra note 61, at 25 (“When investors liquidate or redeem their units, they must receive the 
current net asset value for them.”). 
 104.  See generally Regulation and Operation Memo, supra note 61, at 7 (describing the 
duties of the sponsor when organizing the trust). 
 105.  See Kleiman, supra note 64, at 8-10. 
 106.  See Letter to Pierre de St. Phalle, Esq., SEC Interpretive Letter (May 9, 1995) 
[hereinafter Letter to Pierre de St. Phalle] (concluding that the Investment Company Act 
does not prohibit a UTI from bearing its own organizational expenses). 
 107.  See id. (“open-end and closed-end management investment companies currently 
bear their own organizational expenses, and we see no reason to impose a different standard 
on UITs.”) 
 108.  See An Investor’s Guide to Unit Investment Trusts, GUGGENHEIM INVESTMENTS 6 
(Feb. 2013), http://uit.guggenheiminvestments.com/Libraries/Literature_en/ 
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providing bookkeeping and administrative services to a trust, the sponsor 
may receive an additional annual fee, not to exceed its actual costs.109
The UIT’s supervisor oversees the portfolio.  A supervisor is typically 
empowered to remove a security from a trust, but only in the event that it is 
determined to be (i) detrimental to the trust and the interest of the 
unitholders or (ii) it has suffered a material decline in value or 
diminishment of creditworthiness.110  The supervisor also identifies specific 
securities to be sold by the trust in the event that a non-pro rata sale is 
required to raise proceeds in support of a redemption.111  For providing 
these supervisory services, the supervisor customarily receives a fee, 
provided it is set forth in the relevant prospectus.112
Although the sponsor or trustee may perform evaluation services for 
the UIT, trusts typically employ an investment firm to act as evaluator.113
The evaluator values the portfolio as provided in the trust indenture and 
An_Investor_s_Guide_to_UITs.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/V5FG-G642] (detailing the two 
elements comprising the sale charge for a typical UIT). As there is no ongoing management 
of a UIT, the creation and development fee is paid at the UIT’s inception (and is not 
ongoing). In addition, the depositor may realize a profit or a loss resulting from (i) the 
difference between the purchase prices of the securities to the depositor and the costs of 
such securities to a series, which may be based on the offering side evaluation of the 
securities and (ii) any market making activities with respect to the units. Finally, the 
depositor may realize additional profits or losses during the initial offering period on unsold 
units as a result of changes in the daily evaluation of the assets included in the UIT’s 
portfolio. See generally Unit Investment Trusts – Features, Costs and Compensation,
MORGAN STANLEY (Oct. 2016), https://www.morganstanley.com/assets/pdfs/wealth-
management-disclosures/uit_features.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/D69C-7S89] (describing the 
fees available to a UIT’s sponsor and its distribution partners).
 109.  See Investment Company Act, § 26(a)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26 (providing 
guidelines for the administration of UITs). 
 110.  One UIT sponsor describes this role as follows: 
Securities in a UIT portfolio are generally monitored or supervised by analysts 
who are watchful for unanticipated developments that could make their 
retention in the portfolio detrimental to investors. A security may only be sold 
under limited circumstances in the case of a significant adverse occurrence, 
such as fraud, bankruptcy or a severe change in credit rating. 
See An Investor’s Guide to Unit Investment Trusts, supra note 108, at 5. 
 111.  See, Harman, supra note 7, at 1050 (providing that “for the purpose of meeting 
redemptions, the evaluator may designate the portfolio securities to be sold after 
consideration of a variety of factors such as interest rates, marketability, and market 
value.”).
 112.  See Investment Company Act, § 26(a)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26 (providing that 
the administration of the UIT should be carried out pursuant to the specifications in the 
creating documents). 
 113.  See Gould and Lins, supra note 7, at 1190 (noting that while sponsors and trustees 
can perform evaluation services, a UIT typically has a separate evaluator).  
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according to a written asset valuation policy.114 The evaluator may also 
collaborate with the sponsor and the trustee to select independent 
evaluation providers and pricing vendors.115  The evaluator normally earns 
a fee for these services, provided it is set forth in the relevant prospectus.116
The trustee (i) maintains trust assets, (ii) distributes interest and/or 
dividends paid by the trust’s portfolio, (iii) performs recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements, (iv) provides an annual report to unitholders and 
(v) ensures that all trust expenses are properly paid.117  In exchange for its 
services, the trustee is typically paid an assets-based fee which typically 
ranges from 10-12 basis points.118  To ensure solvency and protect against 
abandonment of the trust, the Investment Company Act (i) requires the 
trustee to maintain aggregate capital of $500,000 and (ii) prohibits the 
trustee from resigning until liquidation or the appointment of a successor.119
UIT units are sold by an underwriter or a syndicate of underwriters.120
In the most typical offering, the underwriter will purchase a specific 
number of trust units on a certain date certain in return for a concession, 
which generally represents a percentage of the public offering price of the 
units.121
C. Fees and Charges 
While each individual offering must be judged on its own merits, it is 
quite possible for the fee structure to offer a commercial advantage for the 
UIT versus other investment vehicles. Because UITs are not actively 
managed, ongoing expenses will generally be low, consisting principally of 
 114.  See Regulation and Operation Memo, supra note 61, at 7-8 (outlining the structure 
of a UIT and specifying the role of the evaluator).  
 115.  See Investment Company Act Release, 50 Fed. Reg. 21282, 21283, n.13 (proposed 
May 14, 1985) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230, 239, 270, 274) (“Instead the structure of 
a unit investment trust is set forth in the trust indenture which designates a sponsor, trustee 
and evaluator to conduct the operations of the trust.”) 
 116.  See Investment Company Act Release, 50 Fed. Reg. 21282, 21283, n.13 (proposed 
May 14, 1985) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230, 239, 270, 274) (noting that evaluators 
are typically paid a fee, including a continuing fee usually paid on a monthly basis). See also
Investment Company Act § 26(a)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26 (highlighting that individuals 
who perform administrative services may be paid a fee). 
 117.  See Regulation and Operation Memo, supra note 61, at 5-6 (laying out the 
responsibilities of a trustee in the UIT structure).
 118.  Id. at 6. 
 119.  See Investment Company Act,§ 26(a)(1) and § 26(a)(3).
 120.  See Regulation and Operation Memo, supra note 61, at 8-9 (noting that 
underwriters usually become owners of units before reselling them to the general public 
while sponsors may purchase units from investors and reoffer them to other investors).  
 121.  Id. at 8. 
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regular annual charges by the Trustee and the evaluator’s fee for ongoing 
evaluations, administration, bookkeeping and continuing portfolio 
supervisory services.  A brief summary of the typical fee structure of a UIT 
follows. 
A UIT sponsor typically collects a transactional sales fee in varying 
amounts which are levied on both primary and secondary market sales.122
The transactional sales fee is established in consultation with the selling 
group and, in most instances, is not retained by the sponsor.  In addition to 
the transactional sales fee, a depositor typically earns a creation and 
development fee for designing and structuring each series.123  This fee is a 
fixed amount per unit and is paid to the depositor at the close of the initial 
offering period or accrued on a daily basis. 
Certain organizational expenses incurred by the sponsor in 
establishing a UIT may be paid by the trust itself in the form of a 
reimbursement.124  Such fees include, but are not limited to, the cost of the 
initial preparation and typesetting of the registration statement, 
prospectuses and other trust documents, the cost of the negotiation and 
preparation of various trust agreements, the fees of securities regulators, 
commodities regulators and state registration fees, the initial valuation and 
audit of the particular series, the costs of any portfolio consultant, any 
licensing fees, the initial fees and expenses of the trustee, the custodian, the 
transfer agent and the administrator, and legal and other out-of-pocket 
expenses related thereto.125
Individual series may incur additional charges in the form of: 
(a) expenses and disbursements for services provided, including 
license fees, legal, tax accounting and reporting and auditing 
 122.  Id. at 7 (explaining the makeup of the sales charge received by the sponsor which 
cover, among other things, distribution expenses, sales commissions and the expense of 
creating and developing a particular series.) 
 123.  See, e.g., A Guide to Investing in Unit Investment Trusts, RAYMOND JAMES (2016), 
https://raymondjames.com/wealth-management/advice-products-and-services/investment-
solutions/unit-investment-trusts [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/672B-U2YF] (observing that creation 
and development fees are paid to the sponsor “from the trust for creating and developing the 
trust and organizing and offering the portfolio.”); UBS, Understanding unit investment 
trusts (2011) https://onlineservices.ubs.com/staticfiles/pws/adobe/uit_disclosure.pdf
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/RAA6-F6YJ] (“Most UITs charge a creation and development (C&D) 
fee to compensate the sponsor for the costs of building the trust.”). 
 124.  See Letter to Pierre de St. Phalle, supra note 106 (agreeing with the requestor that 
the Investment Company Act does not prohibit a UIT from bearing its own organization 
expenses).
 125.  Id. at n.6 (noting such expenses do not include the printing of preliminary 
prospectuses and prospectuses, expenses incurred in the preparation and printing of 
brochures and other advertising materials and any other selling expenses).  
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expenses and expenses of attorneys, accountants and other 
advisors, expenses incurred in connection with any 
communications disseminated in connection with custody or sub-
custody of assets; (b) various governmental charges; (c) foreign 
custodial and transaction fees; (d) fees in connection with the 
execution of the purchase and sale or securities, and foreign 
exchange transactions; and (e) expenses related to the updating of 
the registration statement for a series of a UIT, to the extent of 
legal fees, typesetting fees, electronic filing expenses and 
regulatory filing fees.126
The absence of a board of directors and the lack of portfolio turnover 
mean that the annual operating expenses of a UIT tend to be quite 
reasonable when compared to other investment company products.  
Moreover, some of these expenses will enjoy economies of scale as the size 
of the underlying portfolio grows and certain fixed costs can be spread over 
a larger asset base. 
To further illustrate the fees of a typical UIT offering, an annotated 
hypothetical expense table is provided as Figure 2 below.127
FIGURE 2.128
 126.  See, e.g., Prospectus, Advisors Corporate Trust, Investment Grade 3-7 Year, Series 
4 – A Hartford Investment Management Company (“HIMCO”) Portfolio, Advisors 
Disciplined Trust 1727 at 29, (July 29, 2016) 
https://www.aamlive.com/FISDocuments/FISDocuments/SecurityMaster/52481878/ADT%
201727%20Prospectus%20(002).pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/WA9A-KBE5] (summarizing the 
various expenses applicable to a typical UIT series). 
 127. This table is offered for illustrative purposes only and does not reflect the actual 
fees and expenses of any particular product offering. 
 128. Author created.  
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A UIT’s sponsor and principal underwriter are also subject to the 
standards of Section 36 of the Investment Company Act, which establishes 
a fiduciary duty with respect to the compensation for services and for 
material payments.129
D. The Commercial History of the Unit Investment Trust 
The first true U.S. investment companies of any size or consequence 
appeared in the 1920s, with new funds being created “at the rate of almost 
one a day.”130 Following the market’s crash in the wake of Black Tuesday, 
investors focused attention on products with features of safety.131  The 
open-end fund’s redeem-ability daily at its net asset value, and the fixed 
trust’s elimination of management, held particular appeal for a skeptical 
investor class.132
Fixed trusts flourished in the early 1930s, largely as a “reaction 
against the excesses of managed investment companies.”133  Catalyzed by 
pervasive newspaper, magazine, mail and radio advertisements, over $600 
million in trust certificates were issued in the first two years of that decade 
alone.134  These early predecessors of the unit investment trust “essentially 
served as vehicles through which one could invest in common stocks, 
particularly securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange.”135 The trust 
vehicle enabled investors to pool monies and buy portfolios in smaller 
slices.  Yet, these trusts quickly met controversy, with excessive fees and 
inappropriate advertising threatening the viability of the fixed trust 
structure.136 Abuses continued to plague unitized trusts of the early 1930s, 
 129. See Regulation and Operation Memo, supra note 61, at 24-25 (summarizing the 
fiduciary standard and the process by which a plaintiff may be granted relief). 
 130. THOMAS P. LEMKE, GERALD T. LINS & THOMAS A. SMITH III, REGULATION OF 
INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1 (rev. ed. 1997).
 131.  See Harman, supra note 7, at 1051 (noting that “[f]ixed trusts capitalized on the 
public’s distrust of management by emphasizing the trusts’ “fixed” nature: investors got 
what they saw and could rest assured that no management would later or tinker with their 
investments.”).
 132.  Id. at 1-2.
 133.  See Regulation and Operation Memo, supra note 61, at 3.
 134.  See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM
COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS 238 (2002) [hereinafter MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL
HISTORY] (discussing confederate finance and confederate debt from the mid-to-late 1800s). 
See also H.R. DOC. NO. 76-567 (1940) (discussing the rapid growth and development of 
fixed trusts in the United States and the contributory factors). 
 135.  Harman, supra note 7, at 1047. 
 136.  MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY, supra note 134.
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and their popularity diminished until a new regulatory regime was ushered 
in with the Investment Company Act.137
With the adoption of the Investment Company Act, “unit investment 
trusts” were classified as one of three forms of an investment company.  
These trusts gained in popularity over the next two decades, but “their 
raison d’être had completely changed.”138 The UIT had become a funding 
vehicle utilized to purchase interests in either the stock of a single 
industrial corporation or a particular mutual fund.139 These trusts issued 
“periodic payment plan certificates” as “a mechanism for buying something 
else on an installment basis.”140
The 1960s brought the next incarnation for the UIT vehicle, with the 
trusts employed to provide investors the only tax-exempt means of 
obtaining a diversified portfolio of municipal bonds.141 With the marginal 
tax rate on the wealthiest Americans topping 90% for most of the decade, 
the UIT business relished a prosperous momentum as the preferred vehicle 
of tax efficiency.142  In addition to the tax benefits, municipal bond UIT 
investors enjoyed the protections afforded by the Investment Company Act 
– as the municipal bond market remained virtually unregulated prior to the 
creation of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) in 1975.143
 137.  See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE
SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO REFORM 422 (2006) (describing one commentator referring to 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 as “the most intrusive financial legislation known to 
man or beast.”). 
 138.  Harman, supra note 7, at 1052. 
 139.  See The Unit Investment Trust: Maintaining Integrity Through Time, Olden Lane 
Whitepaper No. 1, 5 (Jan. 2016) [hereinafter Olden Lane No. 1] (noting the UIT had 
become a funding vehicle for purchasing interests in stock or single companies or mutual 
funds).
 140.  Harman, supra note 7, at 1052 (noting that by 1964, over seventy-five percent of 
the $2.9 million active UIT assets were invested in investment companies other than UITs, 
most of which were mutual funds).
 141.  Olden Lane No. 1, supra note 139, at 5 (noting that municipal bond related UITs 
enjoyed a preferred status in the marketplace until the Tax Reform Act of 1976 finally 
clarified that mutual funds could pass through income from municipal bonds on the same 
tax-free basis as investment companies organized as trusts). 
 142.  See generally U.S. Individual Income Tax: Personal Exemptions and Lowest and 
Highest Tax Bracket Tax Rates and Tax Base for Regular Tax, Tax Years 1913-2015, TAX 
POLICY CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=543 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/LQR2-RJ3E] (featuring a chart laying out the tax statistics for the 
relevant time period). 
 143.  See generally Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, Creation of the MSRB,
http://www.msrb.org/About-MSRB/About-the-MSRB/Creation-of-the-MSRB.aspx 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/3C8Q-GTDK] (outlining the history of the MSRB). See also Philip 
Grommet, A Call for Action: An Analysis of the Impending Regulatory Crisis in the 
Municipal Securities Market, 38 J. LEGIS. 237, 248 et seq. (2012) (describing the regulatory 
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The pooling effect of UITs, stuffed with portfolios of municipal bonds, 
offered investors protection from the idiosyncratic risk of single bond 
positions and again provided access to a market that would have otherwise 
remained beyond their reach.144
A combination of historically high interest rates, changing perceptions 
in sources of retirement funding and an uninspiring equity market in the 
1970s motivated individual investors to seek high levels of current 
income.145  In an effort to meet this market need, the first corporate bond 
and preferred stock UIT came to market in 1972.146  The first UIT with 
government securities followed in 1978.147
UIT sponsors pivoted again in the 1980s, embracing equities and 
equity-related strategies in response to evolving investor tastes.  One of the 
most successful and creative trusts followed AT&T’s 1982 agreement to 
relinquish control of the Bell operating companies which provided local 
telephone service throughout the United States.  In exchange for their 
AT&T shares, investors in these “Humpty Dumpty” trusts received when 
issued shares in the seven regional phone companies being spun out of Ma 
Bell. The Merrill Lynch Equity Income Fund First Exchange Series AT&T 
Shares offered these existing AT&T investors the opportunity to retain 
their economic exposure by exchanging AT&T shares for a unit investment 
trust constructed to hold a portfolio comprised of (i) shares of the “new” 
AT&T and (ii) shares of each of the newly created regional operating 
companies.148  The product raised more than $1 billion.149
The first “Dogs of the Dow” UIT provided unitholders exposure to a 
basket of the poorest performing stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average over the prior year.  This strategy also found great success, and 
history and ongoing challenges involving the regulation of the municipal securities market). 
 144.  See Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/RW6Y-HYEU]
(providing data that municipal bonds typically trade in $100,000 round lots, making them 
virtually inaccessible to most individual investors and $100,000 in 1961 has the equivalent 
buying power of $808,458.19 today). 
 145.  Olden Lane No. 1, supra note 139. 
 146.  Olden Lane No. 1, supra note 139. 
 147.  See Harman, supra note 7, at 1053 (noting that by 1986, over ninety percent of the 
7,900 UIT series were invested predominantly in municipal securities). See also 2016 ICI 
Fact Book, supra note 8, at 20. 
 148.  See, e.g., Bill Barnhart, ‘Phone Funds’ Created to Cope with AT&T Stock and 
Spinoffs, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1983, §3, at 3 (discussing the dissolution of AT&T and the 
division of shares); Uncertain Times Ahead for AT&T, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 15, 
1983 (noting that the Merrill Lynch fund has been nicknamed the “Humpty Dumpty Fund” 
and commenting that “[g]oing this route offers simplicity and convenience”). 
 149.  Olden Lane No. 1, supra note 139. 
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marked a significant pivot by UIT sponsors to trusts based on well-defined 
strategies with back-tested results.  Strategies applying screens to re-weight 
established indices based on specific attributes or factors soon flourished 
within the UIT wrapper. In a sense, these techniques amounted to a crude 
predecessor to today’s “Smart-Beta” strategies.150  Buy-write structures 
represented the next UIT innovation; offering unitholders a package 
comprised of a basket of long stock positions plus premium income 
generated from the sale of long term out-of-the-money call options (i.e. 
LEAPs) on the same stock.  These strategies remain popular today for 
baskets of underlying stocks with maturities ranging from one and a half to 
two years.151
For the UIT business, the 1990s was highlighted by the birth of the 
exchange traded fund (“ETF”).  Notably, the first ETFs were structured as 
UITs.152  Over time, however, the ETF market evolved away from the UIT 
structure, finding its requirement that the investment manager attempt to 
replicate fully the underlying index by owning every constituent security 
overly inflexible.  Product structures also balked at the structure’s 
prohibition against reinvesting dividend proceeds in additional securities. 
One of the most high-profile and creative attempts to incorporate the 
unit investment trust structure to meet an identifiable investor demand 
occurred in 1996.  One determined financial professional set out to utilize 
the UIT to “allow small investors to own just a sliver of a single share” of 
Warren Buffett’s much celebrated Berkshire Hathaway.153  With the much-
celebrated stock trading for more than $30,000 per share, Saul Katz was 
drawn to the pooling benefits of the UIT structure.  He planned to buy 
shares of Berkshire Hathaway in a UIT and sell slices of the UIT to retail 
investors.  Buffett resisted the plan, suggesting that the trust was against the 
long-term interest of existing Berkshire shareholders.154  Later that year, 
 150.  Id.
 151.  In 2015 alone, First Trust registered six trusts under its “Capital Strength Buy-
Write Portfolio” banner and raised almost $900 million in deposits. See, e.g., Fact Sheet 
Capital Strength Buy-Write, FIRST TRUST 20 http://www.ftportfolios.com/retail/ 
dp/dpsummary.aspx?fundid=10695 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/H449-CSX2]. 
 152.  An example of a UIT is the SPDR S&P 500® ETF (SPY), the oldest, largest, and 
most traded ETF in the world. Other examples include SPDR MidCap 400® and SPDR Dow 
Jones Industrial Average. 
 153.  Erik Holm and Anupreeta Das, The Pitch for the Berkshire Trust: ‘Mutual Funds, 
Schmutual Funds’, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2016, http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/04/28/ 
the-pitch-for-the-berkshire-trust-mutual-funds-schmutual-funds/ [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/78PJ-
6TFY].
 154.  See Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Chairman’s Letter (Feb. 28, 1997) 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1996.html [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/R9W3-RPB9]
(asserting that the UIT would likely cause a speculative bubble in Berkshire shares and 
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Berkshire frustrated the UIT scheme by announcing plans for a new class 
of B shares, which were initially the equivalent of 1/30th of the existing 
Class A shares of Berkshire.155
Equity portfolios first surpassed fixed income assets (including 
taxable and tax-free unit investment trusts) in 1998.  By 2014, equity 
portfolios accounted for 85% of the assets in unit investment trusts, the 
highest share ever recorded.156  UITs comprised of equity portfolios have 
now accounted for the majority of trusts over the past several decades.157
The large majority of today’s UIT products are focused on quantitative 
strategies,158 asset allocation,159 thematic sectors,160 and income 
generation.161  Unfortunately, existing product continues to be categorized 
rather crudely as “equity trusts” or “fixed income trusts,” with equity trusts 
focused on domestic or international equities and, fixed income trusts 
further categorized as taxable or tax-free.162  A chart of the UIT flows (by 
new deposits) from 1995 through year-end 2015 is provided in Figure 3 
below:
offering that “they would have used our past, and definitely non-repeatable, record to entice 
naïve small investors”). 
 155.  See Anupreeta Das, Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders: Have You Thanked Samuel 
Katz?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/berkshire-hathaway-
shareholders-have-you-thanked-samuel-katz-1461835801 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/XEG7-T29J]
(describing the decision to create a new class of B shares in 1996). 
 156.  2016 ICI Fact Book, supra note 8, at 185. 
 157.  See 2016 Fact Book, supra note 8, at 20. 
 158.  See, e.g., Fact Sheet The Dow Target 10 Portfolio, October 2015 Series, FIRST
TRUST, available at https://www.ftportfolios.com/Common/ContentFileLoader.aspx? 
ContentGUID=4c30f941-b1c1-48d6-815e-08e02b473a34 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/BG9V-
DWPB] (revealing portfolio strategies and quantitative analyses).  
 159.  See, e.g., Fact Sheet, 60/40 Strategic Allocation Portfolio, 4th Quarter 2015 Series, 
FIRST TRUST, available at https://www.ftportfolios.com/Common/ContentFileLoader.aspx? 
ContentGUID=cbf39986-c7a5-4511-9dd0-ad4b3913e96e [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/7R3H-SX2U]
(showing an example of and UIT seeking to invest 60% of assets into common stocks and 
40% into exchange-traded funds).  
 160.  See, e.g., Product Detail, Global Technology Leaders Portfolio – Morgan Stanley,
INVESCO, available at https://www.invesco.com/static/us/investors/contentdetail? 
contentId=870f7f14b6dcf410VgnVCM100000c2f1bf0aRCRD&dnsName=us 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/5VQT-2ACZ] (showing a capital appreciation portfolio). 
 161.  See, e.g., Fact Sheet, Nuveen Large Cap Dividend Portfolio, INCAPITAL, 4Q 2015, 
available at https://www.incapnet.com/Pages/Public/PublicWebsiteDocumentFetch.aspx? 
FileId=da7a23eb-5b33-4651-97d1-7813e059a601 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/6TV3-JNRK]
(discussing the dividend portfolio for Nuveen).
 162.  Regrettably, precision has suffered as the equity category typically includes trusts 
with portfolios comprised of exchange traded funds, closed-end funds and business 
development companies. 
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New deposits
Millions of dollars, annual 
Year Total trusts Equity Taxable debt Tax-free debt 
1995 11,264 6,743 1,154 3,367 
1996 21,662 18,316 800 2,546
1997 38,546 35,855 771 1,919
1998 47,675 45,947 562 1,166
1999 52,046 50,629 343 1,074
2000 43,649 42,570 196 883
2001 19,049 16,927 572 1,550
2002 11,600 9,131 862 1,607
2003 12,731 10,071 931 1,729
2004 17,125 14,559 981 1,585
2005 22,598 21,526 289 782
2006 29,057 28,185 294 578
2007 35,836 35,101 298 438
2008 23,590 22,335 557 698
2009 22,293 16,159 2,201 3,933 
2010 30,936 25,003 928 5,006
2011 36,026 31,900 765 3,361
2012 43,404 40,012 1,236 2,157 
2013 55,628 53,719 916 993
2014 65,529 63,991 624 915
2015 65,949 64,582 492 875
FIGURE 3.163
PART III
This Part offers a general discussion of two related markets; the 
structured notes market and the burgeoning markets for “alternative mutual 
funds”.  As a general matter, each of these product structures provides 
certain tradeoffs for an investor.  Most recently, the structured notes market 
has struggled to attract flows,164 and its growth potential might remain 
constrained by inherent limitations.  By contrast, great excitement has 
accompanied the explosive growth of alternative mutual funds.165  A brief 
 163.  Id.
 164.  See discussion at 165, infra. See, e.g., Daisy Maxey, Advisers Gain Access to 
Complex Structured Products, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424127887323393304578358413092621452 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/QHP8-ANJT]
(describing a market that is still recovering from the losses investors bore following the Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers collapses). 
 165.  See, e.g., Sam Diedrich, ‘Alternative’ or ‘Hedged’ Mutual Funds: What are They, 
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 102 S
ide A
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 102 Side A      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
5_MACCHIAROLA_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/17 11:06 AM
2017] EXPANDING ALTERNATIVES 437 
examination of each follows. 
A. The Market for Structured Notes 
There exists no standardized definition of structured notes in the 
business or regulatory context, or in the federal securities laws.166  Yet, 
structured notes are today found in the portfolios of a significant share of 
U.S. investors.167  A “structured product” is generally understood to be an 
investment package comprised of a fixed income security and an exposure 
to an underlying asset usually achieved through a derivative.168  The 
product’s fixed income portion may provide for interest payments at 
specified rates and intervals, while the derivative provides for the payment, 
if any, due to the investor at the product’s maturity.  The underlying assets 
in a structured investment are “securities derived from or based on a single 
security, a basket of securities, an index, a commodity, a debt issuance 
and/or a foreign currency.”169  A “structured note” simply describes a 
structured product issued in note form, where the requirement to pay the 
return is the obligation of the note’s issuer.170  Today, the structured note 
How Do They Work, and Should You Invest, FORBES, Feb 28, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/samdiedrich/2014/02/28/alternative-or-hedged-mutual-funds-
what-are-they-how-do-they-work-and-should-you-invest/#1c4edadd6200t 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/N6F2-6Y2P] (crediting these funds with “unleashing a new gold rush of 
sorts for alternative asset managers.”). 
 166.  See Jennifer Bethel and Allen Ferrel, Policy issues Raised By Structured Products
1, (Harv. Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 560, 2007) (“A structured product has no precise 
definition, either in a business or a regulatory context.”).  Certainly, the typical structure 
qualifies as a security for purposes of the act, as “notes” are one of the particularly 
prescribed classes of assets named within the “security” definition in Section 2(a)(1) of the 
Securities Act. 
 167.  See, e.g., Craig McCann and Dengpan Luo, Are Structured Products Suitable for 
Retail Investors?, SECURITIES CONSULTING AND LITIGATION GROUP (2006)
http://www.slcg.com/pdf/workingpapers/StructuredProducts.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/9CCW-
J4HU] (“Sales of structured products have soared in recent years as brokerage firms have 
found a retail market for products once sold only to sophisticated investors.”). 
 168.  See Kevin Dugan, Investors seek rules-based indexes to beat stock gains, diversify,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 12, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-
12/investors-seek-rule-based-indexes-to-beat-stock-gains-diversify 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/B93Z-6KSU] (noting that “[b]anks create structured notes by packaging 
debt with derivatives to offer customized bets to retail investors while earning fees and 
raising money.”). 
 169.  NASD Notice to Members 05-59, Structured Products: NASD Provides Guidance 
Concerning the Sale of Structured Products, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., Sept. 2005, at 8 n.1. 
See also Bethel and Ferrel, supra note 166, at 1 (defining a structured product as “a security 
derived from or based on another security (including a bond), basket of securities, index, 
commodity or foreign currency.”).
 170.  See FINRA, Investor Alert, Structured Notes with Principal Protection: Note the 
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market in the United States is a significant (yet stagnant) source of capital 
for many bank issuers, with approximately $43.5 billion in face amount of 
structured notes issued in the United States in 2015.171
Structured notes are regularly included within a broader investment 
portfolio and are employed as a means to achieve specific asset allocation 
objectives.  For example, investors who are confident in a particular market 
view, but only for a limited time horizon, might prefer an exposure that will 
appreciate significantly if the market view is realized, but will terminate or 
can be liquidated within a reasonable time if the expected result does not 
come to pass.172  A structured note might be employed effectively to 
provide an investor: (i) a payout tailored to protect against a decline in the 
price of the underlying asset, (ii) enhanced exposure (i.e. a leveraged 
return) to the underlying asset, (iii) yield enhancement in the form of a 
coupon, or (iv) a bespoke payout different from the standard return 
available from buying or selling a position in the underlying asset.173  In 
fact, structured notes allow investors the flexibility to tailor investment 
exposures to a market view, or to employ a tactical strategy in response to 
challenging market environments.174  Particular offerings can be designed 
to provide full or partial principal protection, leveraged exposure, or to 
hedge a market risk held elsewhere in an investor’s portfolio.  Structured 
Terms of Your Investment, (2011), http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/structured-notes-
principal-protection-note-terms-your-investment#sthash.mc8FyeEQ.dpuf
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/8W2N-PQDS] (“Structured products in general do not represent 
ownership of any portfolio of assets but rather are promises to pay made by the product 
issuers.”); see also Michael C. Macchiarola, Rethinking Sports Wagering, 85 IND. L. J. SUPP.
1, 10 (2010) (“In the typical case, a structured note allows an investor to make an initial 
investment in exchange for an issuer’s obligation to pay an amount at maturity.  The amount 
due at maturity will usually depend upon certain contingent events and their magnitudes.”); 
see also Sidley Austin, Accessing the U.S. Capital Markets–Securities Products: An 
Introduction to United States Securities Laws (2009) at 76 [hereinafter, Sidley Austin, 
Accessing]; see also Frank Armstrong III, Structured Notes Buyers Beware, FORBES (Nov. 
30, 2012, 5:14 PM),  http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/11/30/structured-
notes-buyers-be-warned/#4504a81d210c [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/93FT-KPGE] (“A structured 
note is an IOU from an investment bank using derivatives to create the desired exposure to 
one or more investments.”).  
 171.  This represents a significant decline from a market that regularly enjoyed more 
than $100 million of annual issuance prior to the financial crisis of 2008. See Bloomberg 
Brief, Structured Notes, BLOOMBERG 7 (Jan. 14, 2016) (“[B]anks sold $43.5 billion of SEC-
registered notes last year.”). 
 172.  See SCOTT Y. PENG & RAVI E. DATTATREYA, THE STRUCTURED NOTE MARKET: THE
DEFINITIVE GUIDE FOR INVESTORS, TRADERS AND ISSUERS 302 (1995). 
 173.  Michael C. Macchiarola, Securities Linked to the Performance of Tiger Woods? 
Not Such a Long Shot, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 52-53 (2009) [hereinafter, Macchiarola, 
Securities].
 174.  Id. at 53. 
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notes are also employed as access products to “provide investors with an 
opportunity to access asset classes, such as commodities and foreign 
currencies, which have been primarily available solely to institutional 
investors in the past.”175
A structured note requires an initial investment in exchange for the 
obligation of an issuer to pay an amount at maturity.  Generally, the amount 
due at a note’s maturity is “dependent upon certain contingent events and 
their magnitudes.”176  In addition to meeting the demand for tactical point-
to-point investing, these products have had great allure for an issuer, for 
whom an investor’s initial investment represents a cash inflow at the time 
of the note’s issuance.177  In recent years, however, this flow’s desirability 
has been less certain as large balances can lead to undesirable capital 
treatment for bank issuers.178
The market for structured notes has not been without controversy.  In 
recent years, criticism has focused on several attributes which might make 
the structured note wrapper less desirable than it first appeared.  Critics 
have charged that structured notes have shortcomings in the areas of credit 
risk, liquidity and price transparency.179  Others have pointed to “perceived 
 175.  Id. See also Sidley Austin, Accessing, supra note 170, at 76-77 (naming tax 
simplification and overall portfolio diversification as additional potential benefits to the 
structured notes purchaser).  
 176.  Macchiarola, Securities, supra note 173, at 53. 
 177.  Id.
 178.  See, e.g., John Glover, Biggest Banks to Gain Flexibility in FSB Too-Big-to-Fail-
Fix, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2015, 8:07 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
09-08/biggest-banks-to-gain-flexibility-in-fsb-s-too-big-to-fail-fix 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/V4HY-9G4J] (quoting Head of Structured Bond Trading at Citigroup 
Inc., London, Bhaavit Agrawal) (“[I]f structured bonds are not going to be TLAC eligible, 
banks that rely on structured notes for a sizable part of their funding and need to raise TLAC 
will have to change their funding mix.”).  See also Michael Watt, Structured Products 
Market Wary of TLAC Threat, THE BANKER (July 1, 2015, 10:36 AM), 
http://www.thebanker.com/Markets/Capital-Mkts/Structured-products-market-wary-of-
TLAC-threat?ct=true [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/7QEX-MY4C].  See generally Kevin Buehler et 
al., Between Deluge and Drought: The Future of US Bank Liquidity and Funding 5 
(McKinsey Working Papers on Risk, No. 48, 2013) (noting a dramatic decline in bank 
reliance on short-term funding following the financial crisis in response to regulatory and 
market pressures).  On October 30, 2015, the Federal Reserve Board issued its notice of 
proposed rulemaking relating to certain United States bank holding companies. Among 
other things, United States’ “systemically important banks” will be required to maintain a 
minimum amount of unsecured long-term debt and a minimum about of total loss-absorbing 
capital (“TLAC”).  If structured notes remain ineligible for inclusion in the TLAC 
calculation when the final rule is adopted, either the notes will have to be reshaped to 
qualify as something more TLAC-friendly or a different unsecured debt will have to be 
issued in their place. 
 179.  See generally SEC, INVESTOR BULLETIN: STRUCTURED NOTES (2015) [hereinafter 
SEC, Investor Bulletin].
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and structural inefficiencies” that are “holding back latent demand for 
structured investments.”180  Each criticism is described briefly, in turn, 
below. 
Structured note investors assume the credit risk of the issuing bank. 
Since structured notes place the holder in the position of general unsecured 
creditor of the issuer, investors bear the risk should an issuer fail to repay 
the debt when due.  This means that a structured note’s “underlying 
derivatives could have a positive return but the notes could still be 
worthless which is exactly what happened to investors in Lehman Brother’s 
notes sold by UBS prior to its collapse.”181  Accordingly, investors should 
consider that a structured note adds a layer of credit risk on top of the 
market risk embedded in the underlying derivatives. 
A structured notes issuer often commits to provide secondary market 
liquidity during the note’s term.  While a secondary market provides 
investors some assurance of liquidity, such a provision is far from ensuring 
the ability to sell notes prior to maturity at a particular price.  As a practical 
matter, noteholders are more frequently provided something less than an 
express promise of a secondary market and, therefore, should be prepared 
to hold a structured note to its maturity date.  Even when a secondary 
market is provided, noteholders risk selling at a steep discount to a note’s 
value at the time of sale.  In practice, since structured notes rarely trade 
after issuance, their liquidity is far from reliable.  And, while most 
investors expect to hold structured notes to maturity, unforeseen 
circumstances do arise and “personal emergencies do happen.”182  In such 
circumstances, a selling noteholder is subject to the non-transparent pricing 
of an unreliable secondary market established by the note’s issuer, 
 180.  See Joseph Halpern & Lawrence Solomon, Deconstructed Notes, EXCEED 
INVESTMENTS (Jun. 19, 2014), http://exceedinvestments.com/exceed-investments-survey-
finds-additional-advisor-demand-for-structured-investments-provided-inefficiencies-are-
addressed/#forward. [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/S88B-JPDG] (finding additional advisor demand 
for structured investments provided inefficiencies are addressed). 
 181.  Armstrong III, supra note 170. See also Jonathan Stempel, UBS to Pay $120 
Million in Settlement Over Lehman Notes, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2013, 11:18 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ubs-lehman-settlement-idUSBRE9780KP20130809
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/5BQY-AYEJ] (describing an arrangement in which UBS agreed to pay 
$120 million to settle claims that it misled investors about the financial condition of Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. in connection with the sale of structured notes); Elaine Moore, Banks
Increase Structured Product Offers, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
bc3c3ab4-4c34-11e1-bd09-00144feabdc0 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/V3VV-JXLM] (noting that 
awareness of counterparty risk “has increased since Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008, and 
defaulted on its structured products pay-outs.”). 
 182.  Armstrong III, supra note 170. 
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“assuming they are willing or interesting in making an offer at all.”183
Finally, adding to the opacity of pricing, notes are often valued by a pricing 
matrix or proprietary pricing formula which can result in a value quite 
different than the net asset value calculated pursuant to the more robust 
valuation requirement of a registered fund. 
In addition to the aforementioned structural challenges confronting the 
notes market, the regulatory environment for structured notes has turned 
decidedly challenging in recent years, requiring today’s bank issuers to 
satisfy mistrustful regulators.  In a recent Investor Bulletin, the SEC’s 
Office of Investor Education and Advocacy highlighted several of the most 
prominent potential risks of a structured note investment.  The Bulletin 
identified specifically market risk, complexity, valuation, payoff structure, 
liquidity and credit risk.184  In May 2015, the Chief of the SEC’s Office of 
Capital Markets Trends delivered a speech to an industry group further 
addressing a variety of issues involving structured notes.185 While the SEC 
principally regulates prospectus disclosures, SEC staff has gone further in 
recent years, encouraging issuers to consider whether each new product (i) 
“make[s] sense” for retail investors, (ii) can be readily explained to 
investors who are not sophisticated, (iii) is appropriate for sale to retail 
investors at all and (iv) is correctly priced or could be replaced with a lower 
cost alternative.186
In October 2015, the SEC brought its first case against an issuer of 
retail structured notes.  UBS, one of the largest structured notes issuers, 
agreed to pay $19.5 million to settle charges that it made false or 
misleading statements and omissions in offering materials provided to 
investors in structured notes linked to a proprietary foreign exchange 
trading strategy.187  In June 2016, the SEC agreed to a settlement whereby 
Merrill Lynch agreed to pay a $10 million penalty in connection with false 
and misleading statements in the offering materials provided to retail 
 183.  Id.
 184.  See SEC, Investor Bulletin, supra note 179. 
 185.  Amy M. Starr, Structured Products – Complexity and Disclosure – Do Retail 
Investors Really Understand What They are Buying and What the Risks Are?, SEC (May 14, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-amy-starr-structured-products-.html
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/MF8Q-DNAH]. 
 186.  In her speech, Ms. Starr also noted the growth in the use of proprietary indices in 
certain structured notes, and challenged market participants to ensure that (i) disclosure of 
the key features of the index, including embedded fees and costs, are understandable to 
retail investors, (ii) the brokers and advisors selling the products understand the nature of 
product, and its risks and (iii) broker-dealer policies relating to sales and supervision are 
properly implemented to ensure that proper sales practices.  Id.
 187.  See Press Release, UBS to Pay $19.5 Million Settlement Involving Notes Linked to 
Currency Index, SEC (Oct. 13, 2015) (on file with author). 
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investors for the structured notes linked to a proprietary volatility index.188
Together, the two enforcement actions highlight the fact that the issuing 
and hedging activities performed by banks in connection with structured 
notes present many opportunities for manipulation and conflicts of interest.  
As a result, at least one market observer expects “regulatory attention to 
continue” around the creation and distribution of structured notes.189
B. The Market for Alternative Mutual Funds 
The recent growth of alternative mutual funds has been impressive by 
any measure.  From a base of less than $40 billion around the time of the 
2008 financial crisis, alternative investment mutual funds have now grown 
to nearly $300 billion, with a compounded annual growth rate of more than 
40% during the period.190  Moreover, the combination of increasing 
investor awareness and appetite, and the continued variety and 
improvement in available offerings, is likely to ensure that growth of this 
category continues into the future.191
It is notable that the growth of these funds accelerated in the years 
following the financial crisis.  Much of their appeal can be attributed to the 
relative performance of several particular alternative strategies versus the 
 188.  See Press Release, Merrill Lynch Paying $10 Million Penalty for Misleading 
Investors in Structured Notes, SEC (June 23, 2016) (on file with author). 
 189.  See The SEC, Structured Products, Disclosure, and Retail Investors, (Morrison & 
Foerster, Structured Thoughts News Bulletin, Vol. 6, Issue 4), June 23, 2015, at 5. While 
beyond the scope of this Article, additional pressure on the structured notes market is likely 
to come from the recently proposed regulations of the Department of Labor concerning the 
fiduciary duty owed to employee benefit plans. It is likely that these proposals will result in 
an unfavorable treatment for structured products purchased with retirement monies. See
generally Peter E. Haller et al., The Department of Labor Re-Proposes Fiduciary 
Rulemaking for Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP 5 
(May 8, 2015), http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2015/05/ 
The_Department_of_Labor_Re_Proposes_Fiduciary_Rulemaking.pdf
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/E9WC-CWBS]. 
 190.  Citi Investor Services: Business Advisory, The Rise of Liquid Alternatives: 
Presentation to CAIA in Chicago, 4 (May 21, 2014), http://dailyalts.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/Citi-Rise-of-Liquid-Alternatives.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/7LPV-
5BCC]. See also Finding a New Balance with Alternatives, BMO GLOBAL ASSET
MANAGEMENT 1 (Apr. 2016), http://bmogamviewpoints.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/BMO-Finding-a-New-Balance-Whitepaper-2016_R6.pdf 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/3YVG-TA55] (observing that liquid alternative funds grew from $50 
billion in 2006 to $310 billion in AUM in 2015). 
 191.  See, e.g., Barclays, supra note 47 (noting strong growth related to these assets). In 
fact, some speculate that assets in these funds will exceed $1 trillion in 2018. E.g., Citi 
Investor Services, supra note 190, at 26 (anticipating assets in these funds to increase to 
$1.2 trillion).
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outsized losses in the equity markets during the crisis.192  To a certain 
extent, the financial crisis catalyzed this newline of business and validated 
its defensive bona fides as part of an overall portfolio”.193  In this regard, 
the category’s acceleration represents the tangible manifestation of the non-
correlation that is today becoming a portfolio requisite.194
Given the robust and sustained performance of the equity markets 
since 2008, however, alternative asset classes have confronted some 
performance disappointments.195  The strong equity performance has also 
deemphasized the need for protection within a portfolio in the minds of 
many investors.196  The high cost of the delivery vehicle has also frustrated 
the return expectations for the liquid alternative funds category, as mutual 
funds provide an expensive “wrapper” for relatively expensive alternative 
strategies.197  Despite their impressive growth, many perceptive observers 
have begun to question whether flows into the space are beginning to 
 192.  In 2008, for example, the S&P500 Total Return Index lost 37.00% of its value 
while the Barclays BTOP 50 Index, representing the largest commodity trading advisors, 
returned 13.58%. See Managed Futures: The Potential Benefits of a Short and Long Term 
Perspective, EQUINOX FUNDS 4-5 (2016), 
http://equinoxfunds.com/sites/default/files/Insights_MF%20Potential%20Benefits.pdf 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/2TYP-NLWJ] (comparing the performance of various asset classes over 
the past 15 years). 
 193.  See Olden Lane No. 2, supra note 50, at 5. 
 194.  See Morningstar and Barron’s, supra note 57, at 37 (“Once again, 
diversification/low correlation remains the top driver for investing in alternatives.”).
 195.  According to the Financial Times, “the average fund [in the category] lost money, 
regardless of whether the sector is measured over one, three, five or 10 years.” See Stephen 
Foley & Mary Childs, Liquid Alternative Mutual Funds Leave Investors Disappointed, FIN.
TIMES 1 (May 22, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/a485f82e-1d18-11e6-a7bc-
ee846770ec15 [ HTTPS://PERMA.CC/FQQ2-GRE2]. 
 196.  See Morningstar and Barron’s, supra note 57, at 4 (observing the disappointing 
performance of the “average” fund). 
 197.  See Sulzbach & Masterson, supra note 26, at 1 (explaining that “although 
alternative mutual funds offer investors potential portfolio diversification and return 
benefits, they generally have high fees and expenses and pose unique risks such as volatility, 
the use of leverage, and potentially less liquidity that investors and their financial advisers 
must evaluate.”); see also Olden Lane No. 2, supra note 50, at 5 (observing that, even 
allowing for the general prohibition on most forms of incentive fees in mutual funds, the 
combination of fees in these funds inevitably compromise returns, especially if we are 
entering a period of lower global growth and correspondingly lower market returns, and 
further observing that “[e]fficiency in content and structure then become the contemporary 
investment imperative.”); Dan Weil, Alternative Mutual Funds: Are They Worth It?,
BANKRATE (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/investing/are-liquid-
alternative-mutual-funds-worth-it.aspx [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/P2CA-7JSZ] (reporting average 
expense ratio of 1.78 percent for liquid alternative funds versus 1.31 percent for actively 
managed equity funds). 
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plateau.198  Yet, new market entrants continue to be drawn to the category 
and fund creation progresses in earnest.199  Liquid alternative mutual funds 
have also been forced to confront a growing wave in favor of passive over 
active management.  By one report, in calendar year 2015 alone, passive 
index mutual funds and ETFs brought in $365 billion of new money while 
actively managed funds suffered net outflows.200  Finally, the flow trends 
suggest that certain liquid alternatives investors “aren’t always taking a 
long-term approach to alternatives,”201 instead preferring a more tactical 
approach.  Such a strategy might be at odds with the perpetual nature of the 
current set of available offerings, the rhythm of the offering calendar and 
their underlying fee schedule. 
“Fixed income plus derivative” style products, resembling the 
attributes of a structured note, have already been sold successfully in both 
open-end and closed end fund wrappers.  The giant asset manager, PIMCO, 
for example, has offered open-end funds under its “StocksPLUS” and 
“IndexPLUS” banners for more than twenty years.202  These funds mean to 
blend active and passage management through the ownership of a package 
of assets comprised of (i) fixed income plus (ii) derivatives linked to a 
market benchmark.  Generally, the goal of these funds is to offer investors 
a total return that exceeds the relevant benchmark. 
In January 2012, Eaton Vance successfully raised $26 million for the 
“eUnits™ 2 Year U.S. Market Participation Trust: Upside to Cap / 
Buffered Downside.”203  Offered in a closed-end fund wrapper, the 
eUnits™ represented “a new type of exchange-traded structured 
investment . . . seek[ing] to enable holders to participate in the returns of a 
specified market benchmark over a defined term, typically up to a cap, 
 198.  Morningstar and Barron’s, supra note 57, at 16 (“While this sudden deceleration is 
significant, alts still grew at the fastest clip relative to all other asset classes.”); see also
Liquid Alternative Investments Market Analysis & Performance Summary, GOLDMAN SACHS
ASSET MGMT. 1 (2015 Year End) (“After the turbulent markets of 2015, many liquid 
alternative fund investors, especially those new to the asset class, may be wondering 
whether these investment vehicles work.”). 
 199.  Morningstar and Barron’s, supra note 57, at 5 (“Even as flows have moderated, 
fund companies continue to launch funds at a record clip.”). 
 200.  Eric Balchunas, Passive Revolution, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 14-20, 
2015).
 201.  Morningstar and Barron’s, supra note 57, at 4. 
 202.  Today, PIMCO offers several equity-related strategy funds. For a comprehensive 
listing of the PIMCO family of funds and the related fund documents, see PIMCO, 
https://www.pimco.com/investments/mutual-funds [ HTTPS://PERMA.CC/3LWY-PKWK]. 
 203.  SEC, 1933 ACT FILE NO. 333-163101, EUNITS™ 2 YEAR U.S. MARKET
PARTICIPATION TRUST: UPSIDE TO CAP / BUFFERED DOWNSIDE PROSPECTUS (2012), available
at, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1476721/000119312512024829/ 
d288219dn2a.htm [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/664J-VUZS]. 
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while reducing exposure to loss in the event of a decline in the 
benchmark.”204  Repeating the familiar structured investment of fixed 
income plus derivative, market exposures were achieved through a 
combination of third-party dealer contracts and a portfolio of term-matched 
U.S. Treasuries.  Because of their closed-end fund structure, the eUnits™ 
were able to avoid the concentrated credit exposure that has plagued 
structured notes in recent years by diversifying the fund’s derivatives 
transactions among multiple counterparties and requiring that each 
counterparty post collateral to secure mark-to-market obligations to the 
fund.  Unlike more traditional closed-end funds, eUnits™ represented a 
fixed-term instrument with substantially fixed holdings.  Care was taken to 
mitigate secondary market trading discounts by facilitating arbitrage within 
the structure versus a disclosed hedge portfolio.  Eaton Vance completed a 
second eUnits™ offering in May, 2012, which raised just over $20 
million.205  Together, the eUnits™ product line attracted a variety of 
purchasers, including (i) regular structured notes buyers, (ii) individuals 
who had never bought structured notes, and (iii) individuals who had 
abandoned the structured notes market because of credit-related issues.206
Eaton Vance’s eUnits™ offerings did not represent the first closed-
end fund product with a structured return linked to the S&P 500® Index.  
Almost a decade earlier, Merrill Lynch led the highly successful sale of an 
“S&P 500® GEARED Fund,” which offered a three times levered return to 
the index, subject to a maximum return.  That offering raised $135 
million.207
In November 2013, DoubleLine Capital employed the fixed income 
plus derivative structure to import the smart-beta strategy incorporated in a 
bank developed proprietary index in its DoubleLine Shiller Enhanced 
 204.  Eaton Vance Launches First eUnits™, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 27, 2012), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/eaton-vance-launches-first-eunits-
138196254.html [https://perma.cc/L2T4-YD3K] [hereinafter Eaton Vance Release]. This 
offering allowed investors to participate in the upside of the S&P500® Index up to a 
maximum return of 17 to 23 percent. In the event that the index declined over the term of 
the offering, investors would not experience any loss in respect of any portion of such a 
decline that did not exceed 15 percent of the index’ level at the portfolio’s inception. See
also 1933 Act File No. 333-163101, supra note 200 (explaining the eUnits™ trust 
investment program). 
 205.  Eaton Vance Release supra note 204.
 206.  Discussions that the authors have had with various professionals involved in the 
distribution of these products confirms this to be the case.  All discussions were conducted 
in confidentiality. Names of professionals are withheld to protect confidentiality. 
 207.  Prospectus, S&P 500® GEARED Fund Inc. (Oct. 27, 2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1299506/000119312504180131/d497.htm 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/F2WG-5PW4]. 
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CAPE Fund.208  The open end fund’s strategy employs an “index overlay” 
technique to offer “exposure to the ‘cheapest sectors’ of the large cap 
equity markets” as determined by a proprietary index developed by Nobel 
Laureate and Yale Professor Robert Shiller in consultation with Barclays 
Bank.209  The remaining assets of the fund are invested in a fixed income 
portfolio managed by the celebrated manager, Jeffrey Gundlach.210
According to DoubleLine’s website, “[b]oth segments of the portfolio offer 
a value play in their respective markets,” as the Barclays Shiller CAPE® US 
Sector Index strives to outperform the S&P 500® Index and the managed 
fixed income portion of the fund strives to outperform cash.211  In the end, 
the product hopes to offer “one diversified value product with two unique 
source of possible value.”212
As these offerings of structured products in open end and closed end 
formats have highlighted, in certain circumstances, the fund structure can 
offer significant improvement over the typical structured note.  Most 
notably, a structured fund offers the possibility for (i) decreased credit risk, 
(ii) enhanced transparency, (iii) a more investor-friendly investment 
process, and (iv) tighter secondary market pricing and liquidity versus the 
typical structured note.  Such a structure also embraces an oversight 
regime, which includes the full participation of the SEC’s Division of 
Investment Management, the professionals charged with the oversight of 
registered investment company products.213  In fact, if the style of returns 
 208.  Summary Prospectus, Doubleline Funds, Doubleline Shiller Enhanced Cape, (Jul. 
31, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1480207/000119312515272421/ 
d892910d497k.htm [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/KT8V-46QB].  Interestingly, the product was not the 
first to import a bank-developed proprietary index into an open-end structure. That honor 
seems to belong to the Equinox Commodity Strategy Fund, which was subsequently re-
structured and closed unceremoniously in 2013.  See Press Release, PR Newswire, Equinox 
Fund Management Announces Launch of Equinox Commodity Strategy Fund (June 13, 
2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/equinox-fund-management-announces-
launch-of-equinox-commodity-strategy-fund-123748514.html [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/Y648-
V47F]. See also Chuck Jaffe, Nine Dumbest Mutual Fund Moves of 2013, MARKETWATCH
(Dec. 16, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/9-dumbest-mutual-fund-
moves-of-2013-2013-12-13 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/55BT-UMF5]. 
 209.   Shiller Enhanced Cape, DOUBLELINE, http://doubleline.com/shiller-enhanced-
cape/ [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/SR9W-UB7H] [hereinafter Shiller].  
 210.  For a biography of Robert Shiller, see Short Bio, 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/bio.htm [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/LK3J-X2FQ]. For a colorful 
profile of Jeffrey Gundlach, see Roben Farzad, Jeffrey Gundlach, Bond Savant, BLOOMBERG
(May 10, 2012, 8:15 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-10/jeffrey-
gundlach-bond-savant [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/R4LQ-HFFU]. 
 211.  Shiller, supra note 209.
 212.  Id.
 213.  See generally US Securities and Exchange Commission, Investment Management, 
About the Office, https://www.sec.gov/investment [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/38XK-VQDN] 
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offered by structured notes could be reliably packaged in UITs, the 
resulting products would solve many of the issues that typically befall 
today’s structured notes offerings. 
PART IV 
This Article’s main proposal – that many of the return streams offered 
in today’s structured notes or alternative mutual funds can be offered more 
reliably as unit investment trusts – is not necessarily novel.  In the first 
instance, it is born of an appreciation that the market’s burgeoning 
opportunity is manifestly not more of the same.  Instead, today’s investors 
demand a renewed alignment with product sponsors, rooted in the 
understanding that active management has limited marginal utility in the 
public markets, especially when offered at a premium price point.  
Comparable value might be uncovered in an allocation to efficient vehicles 
to deliver defined outcomes and various sources of beta, ranging from 
traditional to alternative.  Accomplished responsibly, such products might 
bring lower cost, and an increased transparency and liquidity.  High fees 
over any meaningful interval of time only compromise returns, an effect 
that is ever pronounced in a prolonged low interest rate environment.214
This Article’s proposal attempts to synthesize and scale ideas already 
introduced by others.  At its core, this Article argues that the unit 
investment trust structure might be employed more tactically – beyond the 
industry’s currently self-imposed limits.  Done effectively, such an 
undertaking might steal market share from investment offerings that are 
today packaged, out of habit or otherwise, as open-end funds or structured 
notes. 
Integrating structured products return types and the registered funds 
wrapper, in the form of unit investment trusts, addresses a substantial and 
rapidly developing opportunity in the retail marketplace. 
When compared to structured notes, the structured unit investment 
trust presented in this Article offers potential improvement of an investors’ 
experience through mitigated credit risk, improved transparency, and more 
reliable liquidity. 
[hereinafter Investment Management, About the Office].
 214.  See Casey Quirk, The Roar, supra note 5, at 10 (explaining that “In highly 
regulated, fee-sensitive client segments . . . many allocators will use index-tracking 
instruments to replace more expensive, low-tracking-error active managers.”).  
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A. Constructing a Structured Unit Investment Trust 
Structured UITs will mimic the fixed income plus derivative nature of 
a structured note and still maintain fidelity to the fixed trust nature of the 
traditional UIT structure.  Each structured UIT will be a fixed package of 
U.S. Treasuries (or other fixed income securities) and individually 
negotiated options contracts.  The portfolio’s composition will be specified 
in each trust’s governing documents and described in detail in the relevant 
prospectus, which includes a summary of the option contract’s material 
terms. 
More specifically, a structured UIT might seek to achieve a particular 
investment objective by purchasing a combination of (i) U.S. Treasury 
obligations maturing on or shortly before the Trust’s termination date and 
(ii) individually-negotiated over the counter options contracts linked to the 
performance of a particular underlying reference index, also expiring 
shortly before the Trust’s termination.  A basic diagram of the structured 
UIT is provided below as Figure 4.  Depending on its investment objective, 
any such trust might seek to offer a specific level of protection and/or 
enhanced return, put in place at the time of investment and affording 
investors a controlled range of investment outcomes at the expiration of a 
limited term.  Such alternatives would be imparted in a maximum gain,215
contingent principal protection216 and/or participation rate feature217
 215.  Maximum gain features limit the reference asset return available to a unitholder by 
setting a predefined maximum gain.  In the event that the underlying reference asset exceeds 
the maximum gain for a given period, a unitholder will receive only the maximum gain 
amount/percentage. 
 216.  Certain structured UITs may incorporate a contingent protection feature, designed 
to insulate the investor from incurring a principal loss if the value of the reference asset does 
not decline beyond a specified contingent protection level.  In the event that the reference 
asset posts a negative return that exceeds the contingent protection level during the UIT’s 
term, the unitholder will realize a principal loss (excluding sales charges and other upfront 
costs) equal to the loss of the reference asset beyond the contingent protection level.  In such 
a case, the amount returned to a unitholder will be less than originally invested.  For 
example, a structured UIT with a 70% contingent protection level implies that a unitholder 
will receive $1,000 per unit at the product’s termination if the loss of the reference asset 
during the relevant period is not greater than 30% (i.e. 100% - 70%). 
 217.  Certain structured UITs may employ a participation rate feature, allowing 
unitholders to participate in a proportion of the positive return of the reference asset in 
excess of 100%, as specified in a relevant prospectus and often quoted as a percentage (i.e., 
120%).  For a structured UIT with a participation rate greater than 100%, the return to the 
unitholder is calculated as the product of (1) any positive return of the underlying asset (or 
index) multiplied by (2) the participation rate.  This feature allows unitholders to participate 
in an enhanced return of the underlying asset (or index), but will often be subject to an 
overall maximum gain. 
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embedded within the structured UIT’s derivative agreements. 
FIGURE 4.
Structured UITs might provide unitholders economic exposure similar 
to that available in the typical retail structured note, but with structural 
improvement.  The $40 billion a year notes market in the U.S. has stalled 
over the past several years, with investors cautious about the credit risk of 
bank issuers, regulators increasingly hostile to sales practices and banks 
guarded about the balance sheet effects of note issuance.218  The inclusion 
of U.S. Treasuries in the proposed structure ensures that unitholders will 
receive the principal component of the units in excess of any trust 
liabilities.  And, as further depicted in Figure 5 below, each options 
contract may include a bilateral collateral arrangement whereby each party 
pledges to the other a security interest in a segregated collateral account 
held at an independent custodian.  A typical arrangement will require each 
party to fund its respective collateral account to at least the amount of its 
net mark-to-market liability under the relevant options agreement on a 
daily basis.  Options transactions constructed in this way limit the 
investor’s credit risk exposure to a minimal amount and represent profound 
credit enhancement relative to a structured note where any return of 
invested amounts and capital gain takes the form of a general unsecured 
obligation of the financial company issuer.  Counterparty risks may be 
mitigated further by diversifying the structured UIT’s derivative exposure 
across multiple counterparties. 
 218.  See discussion supra note 187. See, e.g., Maxey, supra note 164 (describing the 
hesitation of certain investors to purchase notes following certain bank failures); Amy M. 
Starr, supra note 185 (“My office is concerned that for some complex indices or referenced 
assets or issuers there may be a lack of transparency about the index, asset or issuer at the 
time of issuance and on an ongoing basis.”); John Glover, Biggest Banks to Gain Flexibility 
in FSB Too-Big-to-Fail-Fix, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Sep. 8, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-08/biggest-banks-to-gain-flexibility-in-
fsb-s-too-big-to-fail-fix [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/SSQ6-V2FZ] (describing a new regulatory 
capital treatment for structured notes and its effects on banks). 
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FIGURE 5.
Unlike most retail structured notes, products created as structured 
UITs offer both daily valuation and redemption rights based on net asset 
value in order to abide by the requirements of the Investment Company 
Act.219  These features represent significant advantages relative to a 
structured note where limited secondary market liquidity may or may not 
be available at prices generally determined by the issuer or its affiliated 
broker-dealer rather than a robust market price.220  Properly negotiated 
options agreements will afford a structured UIT elective rights to terminate 
a portion of its exposure on a daily basis and dispute rights in respect of 
unreasonable pricing determinations by the options counterparty.  The 
integration of multiple counterparties in a structured UIT portfolio 
enhances price discovery to inform the UIT evaluator’s determination of 
fair value and any decision by the sponsor to dispute a particular price.  
Thus, a structured UIT investor may confidently rely upon the right to 
redeem structured UIT units on a daily basis at the price determined 
pursuant to a robust valuation process governed by regulatory and 
accounting standards. 
Finally, because any such UIT will be a registered investment 
company, it will offer unitholders more full transparency in respect of its 
design and the contents of its portfolio.  The composition of a structured 
 219.  Investment Company Act, § 22(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-22 (1987). 
 220.  See JPMorgan Chase Financial Company LLC: Capped Buffered Enhanced 
Participation Equity Notes due 2018 Prospectus, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
19617/000095010316015535/dp67930_424b2-3p813.htm [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/EK8Q-CM22]
(explaining “JPMS intends to offer to purchase the notes in the secondary market but is not 
required to do so. Even if there is a secondary market, it may not provide enough liquidity to 
allow you to trade or sell the notes easily. Because other dealers are not likely to make a 
secondary market for the notes, the price at which you may be able to trade your notes is 
likely to depend on the price, if any, at which JPMS is willing to buy the notes.”). 
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UIT’s portfolio and each holding’s contribution to the initial net asset value 
of the UIT will be set forth in audited financial statements contained in the 
structured UIT prospectus.221  The structured UIT prospectus sets forth 
applicable sales charges and trust expenses in a robust tabular format.222  In 
addition, in the UIT market, sales commissions are charged as an amount 
added to the principal investment as opposed to an embedded fee, which is 
typical of most structured notes.  As a result, such charges may become 
evident to an investor simply by comparing the issue price to the economic 
return profile of the product.  Moreover, by moving these product types 
into the UIT universe, product disclosures would benefit from review and 
comment of the Commission’s Division of Investment Management prior 
to the effectiveness of each new product offering, thus allowing the 
industry and regulators to work more closely in crafting plain English 
disclosures discernable to a greater number of investors.  Today, structured 
notes offerings become routinely effective without any period of prior 
examination by the Commission staff. 
Relative to an investment in a structured note, investors in a structured 
UIT would benefit from the express protections of various provisions of the 
Investment Company Act that make such harms much less likely, including 
but not limited to: 
(i) robust registration and disclosure requirements, providing for 
transparency to unitholders in the form of annual reports and 
portfolio schedules;223
(ii) requirement that the UIT adopt and implement written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations 
of the federal securities laws, appoint a Chief Compliance Officer 
to administer the policies and procedures, and review the policies 
and procedures;224
(iii) strict limitations on the UIT’s ability to enter into affiliated 
transactions;225
(iv) requirement that the UIT adopt a Code of Ethics, approved 
by the depositor, and containing provisions reasonably necessary 
to prevent prohibited conduct;226
 221.  Securities and Exchange Commission, Form S-6, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/ 
forms-6.pdf [ HTTPS://PERMA.CC/BX2A-8SGL]. 
 222.  Id.
 223.  Investment Company Act, § 24(f), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-24.  See Regulation and 
Operation Memo, supra note 61, at 16-17 (describing the registration and disclosure 
requirements pursuant to Section 24 and Rule 24f-2). 
 224.  Investment Company Act, 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2003). 
 225.  See generally Inv. Co. Act of 1940, § 17 (1987) (explaining the limitations on the 
UIT’s ability to enter into affiliated transactions). 
 226.  Investment Company Act, § 17j-1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-17 (2012). 
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(v) stringent recordkeeping requirements, including obligation of 
UIT sponsor to maintain records and notify unitholders of 
substitutions of portfolio assets;227 and 
(vi) requirement that the UIT adopt and adhere to robust 
valuation policies and procedures with respect to the net asset 
value of the UIT portfolio.228
B. Favoring the Unit Investment Trust Over Other Registered 
Investment Companies 
The unique attributes of the unit investment trust relative to other 
registered investment companies make it the most suitable vehicle for a 
structured fund. 
The statutory requirement that a UIT maintain a relatively fixed, 
unmanaged portfolio provides investors with greater certainty and 
transparency in respect of the expected return in various market conditions 
than a managed fund can enable.229  The fixed and transparent nature of the 
UIT portfolio is an important attribute for attracting structured product 
investors who expect fidelity to a defined return profile set in place at the 
time of investment. Such investors consider investment products in light of 
personal factors such as investment objectives, risk tolerance and time 
horizon.  Similar to a structured note investment, investors may choose to 
make their investment in a structured UIT understanding that it remains 
protected from subsequent manipulation or modification. 
Further, the absence of management helps to sanitize the structured 
UIT from conflicts of interest that impact other registered investment 
companies.230  Unlike a managed fund, there is no investment manager paid 
a percentage of the value of the structured UITs assets.  Therefore, UIT 
sponsors and evaluators have no incentive to manipulate fair valuation 
determinations to inflate values.  UIT sponsors have no need to advertise 
 227.  Investment Company Act, § 26(a)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-26 (2012). 
 228.  Investment Company Act, § 2(a)(41), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-2 (2012). 
 229.  See Harman, supra note 7, at 1051 (distinguishing fixed trusts from managed 
vehicles); see also A Guide to First Trust Unit Investment Trusts, FIRST TRUSTS, at 2, 
https://www.ftportfolios.com/Common/ContentFileLoader.aspx?ContentGUID=2c0acb75-
c76a-4dd2-b976-cbd5b975c202 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/T9FH-BNUC] (suggesting that the fixed 
nature of the UIT provides the “comfort of knowing what you own and [] eliminate[ing] 
emotional investing” and allows investors to take greater control of overall exposures, and 
avoid concentrated positions and portfolio overlap). 
 230.   See, e.g., LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SEC, supra note 62 (“Management 
is ordinarily reduced to a minimum, because the controlling document, the trust agreement, 
usually specifies not only the securities in which the funds may be invested but also the 
specific number of each security which may be purchased.”) 
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their investment management ability to the market.  There is no incentive to 
manipulate valuations or investments to impact a performance track record.  
Simply, UITs do not afford any party the opportunity to manipulate the 
UIT portfolio in a self-interested manner. 
The costs of investment management and the organization and 
function of an independent Board of Directors are eliminated from the 
structured UIT, allowing the product to operate more cost efficiently than 
managed funds.  This structural efficiency is essential to compete with 
structured notes that may be offered at a minimal expense, and because the 
UIT does not require the infrastructure of a managed fund, the vehicle can 
be profitable for its sponsor with a much lower asset raise.  Moreover, an 
issuer’s commitment to a UIT product has a fixed term, meaning that the 
potential profitability of a product launch does not require a speculative 
assessment of likely investor appetite many years down the road. 
Such features allow for the creation of bespoke product tailored to the 
investment goals and time horizons of a particular investor base and afford 
structured UIT sponsors the potential to contribute a more customized set 
of options for investors, more responsive to individual circumstances than 
any managed fund offering. 
Finally, the possibility of the Rule 487 automatic effectiveness231
allows the structured UIT to wring out much of the cost and uncertainty 
that regularly accompanies the more elastic creation time cycle of the 
typical managed fund.  And, once the creation process is scaled and 
streamlined, the structured UIT creation time cycle should allow an issuer 
to craft timely offerings in response to evolving client tastes in a manner 
not available to even the most efficient open end fund operation.  Such an 
accelerated schedule might allow a fund salesforce to be armed with timely 
thematic product at all times. 
To date, only a handful of UIT offerings identifiable as “structured 
investments” have been brought to market.  In October 2011, for example, 
Advisors Asset Management (“AAM”) offered the Advisors Disciplined 
Trust 459, under the “Multi Enhanced Return Investment Trust, High 50” 
banner.232  Believed to be the first offering of a UIT portfolio comprised of 
a fixed income allocation and a purchased derivative, the product invested 
in U.S. Treasuries and call options on a basket of fifty high dividend paying 
 231.  Securities Act Release No. 6401, supra note 83, at 1.
 232.  See Advisors Disciplined Trust 459: Multi Enhanced Return Investment Trust, 
High 50 October 2011 Series Prospectus, http://pdf.secdatabase.com/193/0001013228-11-
002015.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/DT8L-NWG9] (explaining that the Trust, offered in October 
2011, invested in U.S. Treasuries and call options on a basket of 50 high dividend paying 
stocks and that the collective investment sought an enhanced total return. Barclays Bank 
PLC was the option counterparty). 
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stocks.233  The product was tailored to provide investors what AAM termed 
“an enhanced total return.”234  Following Advisors Disciplined Trust 459, 
AAM brought an additional structured UIT offering to market in January 
2013.235  Advisors Disciplined Trust 927 invested in a portfolio comprised 
of U.S. Treasuries and credit derivatives that offered its investors a high 
yield contingent upon the occurrence of certain credit events related to a 
basket of fixed income securities.236  These early efforts to market 
structured funds struggled to attract significant interest in the retail 
investment community due in part to a general wariness towards the 
complicated and aggressive strategies they employed. 
In December 2012, Matrix Capital Group, Inc. (“Matrix”) attempted 
to register a UIT that offered a similar return profile as the eUnits fund by 
investing in U.S. Treasuries and exchange traded options.237  Matrix 
amended the registration statement for Matrix Defined Trust Series 20 four 
times between February 2013 and July 2014. The registration statement 
failed to gain effectiveness.238  Subsequently, between September 2015 and 
April 2016, three other firms, including AAM, attempted to register 
offerings of structured UITs investing in portfolios of U.S. Treasuries and 
exchange traded options to achieve a structured return profile linked to the 
S&P 500® Index.  None of these efforts have gained effectiveness to 
date.239
 233.  Id.
 234.  Id. at 1. 
 235.  See Advisors Disciplined Trust 972: ARBR Portfolio, Series 1 (Advisors Reference 
Bond Portfolio): http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1556132/000101322813000093/ 
adt972-487.txt [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/A5C5-YEH5] (explaining that the Trust, offered in 
January 2103, invested in U.S. Treasuries and put options and call options on five specific 
corporate bonds. Société Générale was the option counterparty). 
 236.  Id.
 237.  See Matrix Defined Trust 20: Convexcel SUITSM U.S. Treasury Strips and Index 
Option Trust, Series 1 Prospectus, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1468678/ 
000101322812002583/matrixprofinalwrap.htm [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/48WF-BFLY]
(explaining that Matrix Defined Trust 50 is invested in zero coupon U.S. Treasury 
obligations and exchange traded options). 
 238.  See Matrix Defined Trust 20: SEC File No: 333-185505, https://www.sec.gov/cgi-
bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=1468678 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/7DBS-LV7N]
(showing the most recently revised prospectus for the investment tool). 
 239.  See ALAIA Market Linked Trust 1 Prospectus, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652446/000121465915006525/a819150s6.htm 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/4BEP-9N58] (showing a prospectus filed by Beech Hill Securities 
attempting to register a UIT investing in U.S. Treasuries and exchange traded options); 
Elkorn Unit Trust, Series 6: Elkhorn IWM Vest 10% Buffered Return Portfolio Prospectus, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1644051/000152862115003559/s6wraps.txt 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/J7SA-94UH] (presenting a prospectus filed by Elkhorn Securities 
attempting to register a UIT investing in U.S. Treasuries and exchange traded options); 
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In March 2015, Olden Lane Securities LLC, attempted to register a 
structured UIT offering that closely resembled the Eaton Vance eUnits by 
investing in individually negotiated structured option transactions with 
multiple counterparties to achieve a structured return profile linked to the 
S&P 500® Index.240  The authors of this Article were closely involved in the 
efforts to register the offering of Olden Lane Trust Series 1.  In July 2016, 
Olden Lane finally withdrew the registration statement after submitting six 
amendments and engaging in lengthy and exhaustive negotiations with the 
Commission staff between June 2015 and July 2016.241
In recent years, some of the most interesting innovations in the UIT 
space have been found in the efforts of several sponsors to include 
structured payouts within the UIT wrapper.  When compared to structured 
notes, a structured fund offers the potential to improve the experience for 
investors.
However, all recent and current efforts to advance such innovations 
have confronted apparent resistance from the Commission staff and 
experienced prolonged delay or failure to gain effectiveness.  The fate of 
these efforts reveals an apparent policy shift assumed by the Commission 
staff since the AAM and Eaton Vance offerings between 2011 and 2013.  
Yet, the specific policy changes steering the resistance of the Commission 
staff to such offerings remain opaque and absent from the Commission’s 
formal rulemaking and public statements.  The newfound hostility of the 
Commission staff to such innovations appears injudicious in light of the 
significant reduction of credit and liquidity risk that such innovations offer 
relative to registered structured notes, and the improved transparency and 
independence of structured UITs relative to commonplace retail structured 
product.  The proclivity of the Commission staff to implement such 
policies through informal actions and communications designed to disrupt 
the registration of structured UIT offerings is a troubling development for 
the investment management industry.  First, it signals a hostility to the 
Division of Investment Management’s stated charge to facilitate 
Advisors Disciplined Trust 1682: ACE MLTSM Portfolio Series 2016-1 Prospectus, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1662283/000101322816004031/adt1682_fulls6ma
in.htm [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/Y6CU-8LJR] (showing a prospectus filed by Advisors Asset 
Management attempting to register a UIT investing in U.S. Treasuries and exchange traded 
options).
 240.  See Olden Lane Trust 1: Cap Trigger Performance Portfolio Prospectus, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1636919/000091412115000158/ol31884357-
s6.htm [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/A2YK-2QCG] (showing registration statement filed by Olden 
Lane Securities for structured UIT). 
 241.  See Olden Lane Trust 1: SEC File No. 333-202887, https://www.sec.gov/cgi-
bin/browse-edgar?company=Olden+Lane+Trust&owner=exclude&action=getcompany 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/T6W6-ZH59] (noting Olden Lane Securities withdrawal request). 
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appropriate innovation in investment products and services through its 
regulation.242  Moreover, it reveals an inclination to resist financial 
innovation in the shadows and avoid a public airing of the merits of such 
innovations and the formal policies that may be advisable to support or 
resist them. 
PART V
Much work remains to refine and streamline a process by which 
alternative streams of return and smart beta solutions might be reliably and 
repeatedly packaged within structured unit investment trusts.  Enough 
evidence exists, however, to intrigue many market observers as to the 
possibilities.  When measured against the typical open-end mutual fund, the 
unit investment trust might offer a cheaper and more streamlined wrapper.  
With significantly lower costs for its issuer than an open end fund, the UIT 
offers a scalable package by which customized risk exposures to 
underlying assets might be neatly tailored in registered form, on a bespoke 
basis and with a non-perpetual life.  These advantages play particularly 
well in an investment world clamoring for tailored solutions and fearful of 
over-building product into a distribution model requiring great expense and 
reliant on a sizeable headcount for success.  And, when compared to 
structured notes, the UIT might provide its unitholders ease of use, 
improved liquidity and transparency and substantially mitigated credit risk. 
While there are no certainties in the uncertain world of structured 
finance, the unit investment trust warrants a closer look by those eager to 
embrace the possible.  Still, those excited by this Article’s ideas would do 
well to recall the old adage: a million dollars of ideas ain’t worth a dollar of 
execution!
 242.  See generally, Investment Management, About the Office, supra note 213.
